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PERFECT STORMS: CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
JOY SABINO MULLANE*
I. INTRODUCTION
EXECUTIVE compensation has been front-page news for much of thepast decade, beginning with the fall of Enron Corporation and ending
most recently with the meltdown of the financial sector of the U.S. econ-
omy.1  During this time frame, Congress enacted several significant pieces
of legislation containing provisions designed to regulate executive pay in
some manner.2  Together, these events generated a significant body of
scholarly literature addressing the merits of pay regulation in general or
assessing particular aspects of enacted legislation.3
The twenty-first century, however, is not the first time in U.S. history
that controversy over executive pay and resulting legislation has been the
subject of intense academic study.4  In each prior instance, though, most
of the literature examining the regulation of executive compensation fo-
cused on a narrow point in time and limited legislative scope.5  Neverthe-
* Associate Professor, Villanova University School of Law.  I sincerely wish to
thank Gregg Polsky, the participants of the Villanova Law Review Norman J.
Shachoy Symposium on the U.S. Taxation of Offshore Activity, and Regulating
Executive Compensation, held on September 23, 2011, the University of
Cincinnati Faculty Exchange Workshop, and Villanova University School of Law’s
Summer Junior Faculty Workshop Series.  I would especially like to express my
appreciation for the dedication of Teri Ravenell in reading countless drafts of this
and other articles.
1. For a discussion of this decade’s financial downturns and related scandals,
see infra notes 131–76.
2. See id.
3. Indeed, the literature is too voluminous to provide an exhaustive string cite
here.  Instead, for a discussion of several of the most recent legislative enactments
addressing executive compensation, see infra notes 141, 150, and 176.
4. For a discussion of the deeply rooted history of executive compensation,
see infra notes 9–176.
5. This makes sense for a variety of reasons, including allowing for a fuller
examination of a particular piece of legislation.  It is also the result of the fact that
executive compensation is subject to regulation in a variety of forms, covering
more than one academic discipline.  Scholars, understandably, tend to concen-
trate on the area in which they are experts.  Thus, corporate governance scholars,
for example, typically focus on corporate governance legislation affecting execu-
tive pay to the exclusion of tax legislation.  Tax scholars likewise tend to stay on
their side of the academic dividing line. Executive compensation scholarship, par-
ticularly from the corporate governance angle, is wont to compare and contrast
the focus of a particular writing with events or legislation from the Great Depres-
sion era.  See, e.g., Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach
to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 62 (1992) (referring to early 1990s pub-
lic opinion towards executive compensation packages as “echo of the 1930s”); An-
drew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press?
(589)
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less, a longer and wider view of congressional regulation of executive
compensation is warranted.  This Article considers the executive compen-
sation debates of the past century and resultant regulations that have
arisen.6  From this historical perspective, it draws some important insights
regarding the factors that elicit legislative regulation of executive compen-
sation, and provides a prescription for future regulation in this area.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides the historical con-
text of executive pay regulation in broad outline.  It begins with the rise of
the modern corporate executive in the early 1900s, and the public’s awak-
ened awareness of executive compensation in the aftermath of the Great
Depression. This part ends with present-day events.
Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1992, at 28 (discussing events of
early 1990s and 1930s); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 90–94
(2003) (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Great Depression era from U.S. his-
tory); Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 A Year”: The Fight Over Exec-
utive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 696 (2010) (discussing
Great Depression era in great detail).  There is generally, however, little to no
consideration of others eras, and legislation therefrom, within a given article.
Again, this makes sense considering the most significant pieces of corporate gov-
ernance legislation were enacted in the Great Depression era and then not again
until the twenty-first century.  In the intervening years, however, Congress enacted
important pieces of tax legislation regulating executive compensation.
This Article merges the history of legislation regulating executive pay through
the vehicles of corporate governance legislation and tax legislation, and draws in-
sights therefrom.  Note, however, that this Article generally does not discuss other
modes of regulation, such as administrative law developments or changes in ac-
counting practices.  Further, when it comes to considering prescriptions for
problems in executive pay legislation, this author remains rooted in tax law.
6. This Article is the first to consider in depth the factors that trigger legisla-
tion regulating executive compensation from the inception of such regulation in
the 1930s.  Prior to this Article, scholarship generally mentions possible factors in
brief passing commentary, with most of the focus on the nexus of regulation and
the state of the economy. See, e.g., Brownstein & Panner, supra note 5 at 28 (briefly
mentioning factors perceived as relevant to debate over executive pay in 1990s,
such as new corporate proxy environment, economic recession, Americans’ per-
ception of declining competitiveness, and election year); Louis M. Thompson, Jr.,
The SEC Targets Executive Pay, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 1991, at 48, 48 (edito-
rializing that it “did not take a whiz kid” to realize that Congress would get in-
volved with such an “emotionally charged issue” as excessive compensation in time
of recession). But see Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensa-
tion, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 714-15 (1995) (examining in depth “the political and
economic forces that created the controversy over executive compensation” in
early 1990s and proposing that those forces are “fundamental and rapid changes
in the United States and world economies that began in the mid-1970s and will
continue throughout the next several decades”).  Importantly, this Article shows
that an economic downturn alone is insufficient to generate legislation in this
area.
It is worth noting that Professor Larry Ribstein has considered the causes of
securities regulation. See Ribstein, supra note 5.  Focusing primarily on two points
in U.S. history (the stock market crash of 1929 and the bursting of the internet
bubble in the early 2000s), Professor Ribstein concludes that securities regulation
follows a “boom-bubble-bust” cycle. See id. at 78 (discussing, too, other scholars
reaching similar conclusions regarding securities regulation).
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Part III then analyzes this history and finds that legislation regulating
executive pay is enacted when three factors coalesce: economic turmoil
(i.e., a recession), rising unemployment, and an executive pay controversy.
The foregoing factors are instructive; they support the instinctive notion
that the state of the economy, reflected to some extent by the unemploy-
ment rate, is important when it comes to inciting serious criticisms about
executive pay.  However, it is important to note that, alone, both a declin-
ing economy and rising unemployment rate are insufficient to trigger reg-
ulatory legislation.7  Legislation results when those factors are combined
with an executive pay controversy that acts as a focusing event.8
Given the increasing frequency with which these factors have been
converging in modern times, it is reasonable to conclude that they are
likely to occur again.  Through the lens of tax-based regulation of execu-
tive pay, Part IV thus considers the predicament of a Congress compelled
at certain points in time to “do something” about executive pay, but that
resulted in legislation that is widely viewed as seriously flawed.  It suggests
that the most viable of imperfect solutions is to enact this legislation with a
sunset provision.  Part V concludes the Article.
II. A CONCISE SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
A. The Rise of the Modern Executive in the Early 1900s
Executives, as we now conceive of them, are a twentieth century in-
vention.  Less than one hundred years ago, large commercial enterprises
led by professional managers were a relatively new phenomenon.9  The
earliest business leaders were owner-managers whose fortunes were bound
to those of the company through stock ownership.10  As such, there was a
natural incentive—naked self-interest—to managing the company with
7. See, e.g., infra notes 177–206.  Also illuminating is noting what factor does
not seem to matter much: how much executives are paid.  History shows that the
public displays significantly less concern and interest in executive pay, even as it
increases dramatically, so long as the economy is doing well, jobs abound, and
there are no pay controversies to catalyze public sentiment. See infra notes
199–202.
8. A focusing event is “a crisis or disaster that comes along to call attention to
[a] problem” and push “people in and around government” to address it. JOHN W.
KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 94–95 (2d ed. 1995).  This
definition is a bit strong for the events described in this Article, but it is neverthe-
less a helpful way of conceiving of the function of the executive pay controversies
throughout the last century.
9. See George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 733, 733-34 (1941); Wells, supra note 5, 695 (observing that early twentieth
century America witnessed shift from proprietary management system in which
corporate control was vested in “individuals who owned an appreciable percentage
of the firm and whose economic rewards derived mostly from ownership” toward
executive management as large corporations became more common).
10. See Wells, supra note 5, at 696.
3
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the utmost diligence, and manager salaries were rarely extraordinary, with
little or no opportunity for additional performance-based pay.11
This corporate structure began changing as business operations grew
in size and complexity.12  Professional managers, a new class of executive
that had little or no personal ties to the corporation, gradually replaced
owner-managers.13  The emergence of professional executives generated
new challenges for the business owners.  Among them, the separation of
ownership and management created a need to align the executives’ inter-
ests and the interests of the owners.14  The response to this need was the
introduction of performance-based compensation as a component of an
executive’s pay package.15
Incentive programs were thought to encourage professional execu-
tives to perform with the same diligence as the owner-managers by tying
11. See F.W. Taussig & W.S. Barker, American Corporations and Their Executives:
A Statistical Inquiry, 40 Q.J. ECON. 1, 19 (1925) (noting that one study found that in
1904-1914 executives of largest manufacturing companies received on average sala-
ries approaching $10,000, approximately $228,515.15 in today’s dollars); Washing-
ton, supra note 9, at 734 (“The corporate manager, as such, simply had no place in
the upper income levels.”).
12. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU-
TION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (observing that small traditional enterprises
were replaced with multi-unit businesses with complex hierarchies and profes-
sional managers); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern Corporation
Law: The Law of Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 605, 608 (2005) (stating in-
creased size and complexity of corporations has created modern-day organizations
with “complex multi-tiered corporate structures”); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without
Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1872 (2003)
(stating early twentieth century shift to multiunit enterprises required use of “dis-
persed shareholders” and “concentrated management”).
13. See, e.g., Taussig & Barker, supra note 11, at 2 (recognizing that at time of
their writing, in 1925, “[i]ncorporated industry under salaried managers [was] the
order of the day.”); Washington, supra note 9, at 734 (offering profile of new gen-
eration of executives).
14. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4–5 (1933) (coining the phrase “separation of ownership
and control” and discussing significance); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law,
24 IND. L. REV. 223, 229 (1991) (noting rise of professional managers created gulf
between owners and management, as well as threat that “corporations might not
be managed in the best interests of those who had contributed their capital [as
shareholders]”); Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of
Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 273–74 (2008) (describing shareholders,
directors and officers as “distinct constituencies” and suggesting their competing
interests must be balanced).
15. See Marlo A. Bakris, Note, Executive Compensation Disclosure: The SEC’s New-
est Weapon in its Arsenal Against Executive Compensation Abuses, 71 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 105, 111–12 (1993); Barris, supra note 5, at 68 (recognizing need to compen-
sate salaried executives differently than owner-managers); Washington, supra note
9, at 734 (explaining how executive identity helped to shape compensation pack-
ages).  Performance-based pay was unnecessary when the manager was also the
owner and as such necessarily reaped the rewards of good performance or suffered
the loss of bad performance.
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the executive’s fortunes to that of the company’s.16  In theory, this means
the executive risks receiving little or no pay if the company does not per-
form as expected.  To offset this risk, a premium is added to the amount
of compensation paid to the executive if the company performs well, in-
creasing overall compensation above the level that would have been paid
absent the presence of performance-based risk.17
The separation of ownership and management was also the impetus
for increasing levels of an executive’s base salary.  Corporate boards
thought offering a generous salary was necessary to attract and retain a top
executive who would be able to successfully manage the company.18
These increases, combined with incentive pay, laid the foundation for
modern debates about both the level and types of pay executives receive.19
16. See Barris, supra note 5, at 61 (explaining that salaried executives had “lit-
tle incentive” to perform at level “greater than that required to retain their posi-
tions”); see also Bakris, supra note 15, at 105 (describing as “universally understood”
notion that pay encourages better results); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Mar-
tin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 31, 38 (2000) (stating executive compensation packages comprised of salary
and bonuses alone are arguably inferior to those that include incentive compensa-
tion). But see Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of
Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677,
679–82 (arguing that, in light of evolving corporate governance mechanisms, push
for greater and greater incentive pay is no longer warranted).  It is noteworthy,
however, that performance-based pay has existed in some form for thousands of
years.  Julius Caesar created an incentive program for his armies, granting bonuses
to soldiers after successful conquests. See Bakris, supra note 15, at 105.
17. See Kevin J. Murphy, supra note 6, at 739 (detailing performance-based
and non-performance-based compensation); Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 887–88 (2007)
(discussing performance-based pay).
18. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 47 (1991) (noting boards’ reluctance to reduce executive
compensation even during declines in profitability to ensure retention of top tal-
ent); see also Bakris, supra note 15, at 111 (offering corporate rationales for large
executive compensation packages such as necessity of large salaries for corporation
seeking to ensure continued success by attracting and retaining top executive tal-
ent); Washington, supra note 9, at 734 (noting that manager-for-hire was not neces-
sarily independently wealthy, and in absence of stock ownership, sought large
salaries to both provide for his future and maintain lifestyle of executive in large
company).
19. With the shift in executive identity, “[b]y 1928 the executives of some of
[America’s] largest companies were receiving compensation running as high as
$1,000,000 or $1,500,000 annually” (approximately $13,229,825 or $19,844,737 in
today’s dollars).  Washington, supra note 9, at 734; see also Taussig & Barker, supra
note 11, at 19 (explaining that salaries “greatly increased” during World War I and
remained high after war’s end).  Additionally, executives were awarded an array of
profit-based bonuses. See Wells, supra note 5, at 700 (“Executive bonus plans flour-
ished in the 1920s.”); Washington, supra note 9, at 737–56.
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B. The Revelation of Executive Pay: The Great Depression Era
The Great Depression era, by most accounts, began in 1929 and
lasted through the late 1930s or early 1940s.20  The beginning is often
marked by the stock market crash of October 29, 1929, referred to as
Black Tuesday.21  Thereafter, the world plunged into a deep economic
depression.22
Scores of Americans lost their jobs.  In the years leading up to the
Great Depression, the unemployment rate in the United States was around
3.3%.23  In 1930, the rate jumped to 8.9%, and it almost doubled by 1931
to 15.9%.24  Unemployment was at its highest during this era in 1933,
when the rate hit 24.9% before slowly declining to 17.2% by 1939.25
Although the lives of executives had long been a popular subject of
the media, albeit mostly favorable, executive pay arrangements first re-
20. See THOMAS E. HALL, BUSINESS CYCLES: THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF ECO-
NOMIC FLUCTUATIONS 153, 160 (1990) (discussing business cycles); see also Nicholas
Crafts & Peter Fearon, Lessons From the 1930s Great Depression, 26 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 285, 291 (2010) (stating American economy peaked in August of 1929
before Great Depression commenced in earnest with Wall Street Crash of October
1929); Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD.
L. REV. 515, 524 (2003) (noting American economy did not rebound to 1929 levels
until 1939) Christina D. Romer, The Nation in Depression, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 20
(1993) (observing industrial production peaked in 1929 in United States before
sharply declining).
21. See Donald J. Kochan, Black Tuesday and Graying the Legitimacy Line for Gov-
ernmental Intervention: When Tomorrow Is Just a Future Yesterday, 15 NEXUS 107, 107
(2010) (referring to Black Tuesday as “[a] day that will live in infamy”); Mark J.
Wolff, Congressional Unilateral Tax Treaty Overrides: The “Latter in Time Doctrine” Is
Out of Time!, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 749 (2009) (“Black Tuesday became synonymous
with the Great Depression.”); see also N. Gregory Mankiw, But Have We Learned
Enough?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, at BU1 (noting Black Tuesday crash lowered
stock prices, created loss of wealth and discouraged consumer spending which has-
tened Great Depression).
22. See Ben S. Bernanke & Kevin Carey, Nominal Wage Stickiness and Aggregate
Supply in the Great Depression, 111 Q.J. ECON. 853, 853 (1996) (contending “world
economy collapsed in the 1930s” and examining cause of crisis in twenty-two coun-
tries worldwide); Crafts & Fearson, supra note 20, at 294 (asserting international
reliance on gold standard was primary reason Great Depression effects were trans-
mitted worldwide); Robert C. Effros, Sir Joseph Gold and His Times, 8 L. & BUS. REV.
AMERICAS 9, 14 (2002) (observing that during 1930s, “the world experienced its
greatest collapse of commodity prices and shrinkage of world trade”).
23. See infra Appendix (chart of unemployment rate spanning years 1923 to
2010).  It should be noted that the unemployment rate is a lagging indicator. See,
e.g., Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, The Effect of Minimum Wages on Immi-
grants’ Employment and Earnings, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 544, 555 (2008) (noting
that “the unemployment rate, unlike employment, lags economic activity”).  In
other words, it measures an effect after an occurrence.  Thus, the unemployment
rate will continue to rise for a period even after the economy has started to re-
cover, and conversely will remain low for a period after the economy has started to
falter.
24. See id. (reporting unemployment rate in 1930 and 1931).
25. See id. (noting unemployment rate was highest in 1933).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol57/iss3/9
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-3\VLR309.txt unknown Seq: 7 30-NOV-12 10:37
2012] PERFECT STORMS 595
ceived public attention during the Great Depression.26  Before then, cor-
porations closely guarded information concerning their financial
condition and business practices, including executive pay levels.27  As a
result, stockholders and the general public had been unaware of the size
of executive compensation packages.  In the early 1930s, however, execu-
tive compensation levels emerged into the public sphere as a result of liti-
gation28 and congressional investigations.29  The size of the pay packages
26. See HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 487 (1970) (noting post-Depression interest in executive
compensation); Wells, supra note 5, at 709 (observing executive compensation be-
came focus of public debate during 1930s); see also Katherine M. Savarese, “Per-
verting Civilization” or Pursuing Dreams?: Economic Arguments About Executive
Compensation Practices in the United States, 1890 to 1940 14–15 (Apr. 2010)
(working paper), available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~histecon/crisis-next/
1907/docs/Savarese-Executive_Compensation.pdf (stating press coverage pre-dat-
ing Great Depression was favorable and framed executives as source of awe or
entertainment).
27. See Barris, supra note 5, at 61 (identifying secrecy as primary shield from
public resentment over executive compensation); Taussig & Barker, supra note 11,
at 7 (stating that “[n]o economic data are so hard to procure as the jealously
guarded figures of earnings, accruals, business profits, and salaries”); Detlev Vagts,
Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231,
245 (1983) (discussing corporate tradition of secrecy); Washington, supra note 9,
at 756; see also Savarese, supra note 26, at 15–17 (asserting public was unaware or
apathetic to executive salary prior to Great Depression).
Until laws were enacted as part of New Deal legislation, publicly traded com-
panies were not required to disclose information about compensation. See Wells
supra note 5, at 707–08 (noting public companies were not required to and did not
routinely disclose executive compensation levels prior to 1930s).
28. See Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 154 A. 321, 321 (N.J. Ch. 1931)
(enjoining Bethlehem Steel from awarding further payments as part of bonus
scheme characterized as “exorbitant” by shareholders); see also Rogers v. Hill, 53
F.2d 395, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (requesting judicial intervention to compel disclo-
sure of bonus payments to American Tobacco Company executives between 1921
and 1930); Rogers v. Am. Tobacco Co., 257 N.Y.S. 321, 325 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (af-
firming “stockholders’ privilege of demanding a full disclosure by the directors”);
Barris, supra note 5, at 62 (noting that shareholder litigation helped to unearth
previously unpublished information regarding executive compensation); Vagts,
supra note 27, at 245 (recognizing that several otherwise undisclosed salary figures
were publicized through litigation they inspired).
29. See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing on S. 84 and S. 239 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 72d Cong. Pts. 1–6 (1932) (investigating causes of stock mar-
ket crash); Stock Exchange Practices: Hearing on S. 56 and S. 97 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. Pts. 1–20 (1933), available at http://fraser.stlouis
fed.org/docs/publications/sensep/19340606_sensep_rpt.pdf (same); S. Res. 75,
73d Cong. (1933), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publication/?pid=87
(directing Federal Trade Commission to gather information on salaries received
by “executive officers and directors” of corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce and listing securities on New York Stock Exchange or New York Curb Ex-
change); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 25 (1934), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
annualreports/ar1934.pdf) (reporting findings submitted to Congress in fifteen
volumes detailing salary information for 1928–1932).
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these events revealed were simply stunning to the American public, and
galvanized legislators to begin regulating executive pay.30
The earliest challenges to executive compensation at large corpora-
tions came in the form of shareholder lawsuits in 1931.  Through disclo-
sures made during litigation related to a proposed merger, shareholders
of Bethlehem Steel, one of the nation’s largest companies, first learned of
the size of the compensation paid to the company’s executives.31  The
enormity of the pay was due in large part to incentive compensation—
bonuses—not the executives’ fixed salaries.32  After this pay information
was disclosed, four stockholders sued for a return of the extravagant bo-
nuses and sought an injunction against further payments.33  The Bethle-
hem Steel suit ultimately settled.  However, a shareholder of the American
Tobacco Company, another large corporation, sued in 1931 to inspect
company books to obtain information about executives’ compensation.34
The shareholder won, and, upon learning the significant sums paid to ex-
ecutives, brought further suits attacking the company’s compensation
plans.35  In the end, these prominent suits as well as suits against other
large companies revealed previously unpublished information regarding
30. See Wells, supra note 5, at 690.
31. See Washington, supra note 9, at 738.
32. See id. at 757.
33. Berendt, 154 A. at 321 (enjoining Bethlehem Steel from awarding further
payments as part of bonus scheme characterized as “exorbitant” by shareholders);
see also Washington, supra note 9, at 737–41 (providing narrative history of Bethle-
hem Steel litigation).
34. Rogers v. Hill, 53 F.2d 395, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (requesting judicial inter-
vention requiring disclosure of bonus payments to American Tobacco Company
executives between 1921 and 1930); Rogers v. Am. Tobacco Co., 257 N.Y.S. 321,
325 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (affirming “stockholders’ privilege of demanding a full disclo-
sure by the directors”); see also Washington, supra note 9, at 741–48 (detailing
American Tobacco Company bonus practices and litigation).
35. See generally Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933) (detailing shareholder ac-
tion to recover more than $1 million in bonuses paid to executives of American
Tobacco Company).  In Rogers, the Supreme Court famously recognized the doc-
trine of corporate waste, stating that bonus payments that bore no relationship to
services rendered by executives were in fact gifts that could not be granted without
majority shareholder approval. See id. at 591–92; Steven C. Caywood, Note, Wasting
the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution in Control-
ling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 117 (2010).  Since the
time of Rogers, the corporate waste doctrine has not provided strong grounds for
challenging executive compensation payments. See Rogers, 289 U.S. at 591–92;
Caywood, supra, at 117; Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: Cor-
porate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 494 (2005) (recognizing courts’
general unwillingness to consider compensation disputes).
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executive compensation.36  This information was reported in the press
and ignited public indignation over high executive pay.37
Various congressional investigations were also unearthing informa-
tion about executive pay.  In 1932, a senate committee examining the
causes of the stock market crash scrutinized the salaries and tax returns of
the banking executives appearing in hearings before the committee.38
The process revealed the disturbing information that prominent banking
and investment executives in some instances managed to pay no federal
income taxes and in others received compensation considered exorbitant
at that time.39
Then, in 1933, the Federal Trade Commission began preparing a re-
port on the “Compensation of Officers and Directors of Certain Corpora-
tions” pursuant to a Senate resolution calling for such information.40  The
report was completed and its findings made public in 1934, triggering fur-
36. See Barris supra note 5, at 62 (stating litigation by shareholders during
1930s “unearthed some of the previously hidden information” regarding executive
compensation); Vagts, supra note 27, at 246 (observing litigation “unearthed” high
levels of executive pay occurring during 1920s); Wells, supra note 5, at 710 (sug-
gesting executive salaries at Bethlehem Steel would have “stayed a secret” but for
litigation).
37. See Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate
Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (1993) (labeling disclosed executive salaries
“obscene” when compared to earnings of teachers, construction workers, and
sweatshop employees in time period); Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Execu-
tive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduci-
ary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 858 (2011) (highlighting Fortune magazine poll
following salary disclosures reflecting public disapproval of executive salary);
Wells, supra note 5, at 713 (observing salary revelations “particularly stung in a
period when many were out of work . . . and wages were reduced for those with
jobs”).
38. For a discussion of those hearings, see supra note 29 (citing hearings); see
also Wells, supra note 5, at 714 (describing information revealed by the Pecora
investigation).  The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency launched an in-
quiry into the causes of the nation’s economic decline in 1932, which generated a
wealth of information after Ferdinand Pecora assumed leadership of the investiga-
tion as chief counsel in 1933.  The so-called “Pecora investigation” produced
12,000 pages of documents detailing Wall Street excess, fraud, and tax evasion in
the years leading up to the stock market crash of 1929. See Ron Chernow, Where Is
Our Ferdinand Pecora?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at A2 (describing Pecora investiga-
tion by Senate Committee on Banking and Currency); Amanda Ruggeri, Pecora
Hearings a Model for Financial Crisis Investigation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept.
29, 2009, at 2, http://www.usnews.com/news/history/articles/2009/09/29/
pecora-hearings-a-model-for-financial-crisis-investigation (crediting Pecora’s
“methodical[ ] prosecutorial style” with uncovering salary information that lead to
resignation of National City Bank’s chairman and president, and set stage for re-
form legislation).
39. See Wells, supra note 5, at 714 (“Pecora disclosed, for example, that the
partners of J.P. Morgan paid no taxes in 1931 or 1932,” and that Charles Mitchell,
President of New York’s National City Bank and its affiliated securities firm, Na-
tional City Company, had received over one million dollars in compensation in
1927, 1928, and 1929).
40. For a discussion of the Senate Resolution, see supra note 29 (citing Senate
resolution).
9
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ther public resentment of corporations and executives.41  As one re-
searcher has noted:
[T]he report was groundbreaking in the public attention it fo-
cused on long held company secrets.  For the first time in U.S.
history, the average citizen experienced a clear picture of the in-
ternal operations of some of the largest corporations in the world
that, in many ways, had strong indirect influences on the lives of
most people in the country.42
One of the most shocking revelations to come forth during this era
was how little the stock market crash of 1929 and the early years of the
ensuing depression affected the compensation level of many executives.
Most bonus payments, of course, disappeared as profits did, but salaries
remained largely intact.43  Indeed, some managers received salary in-
creases to compensate for lost incentive pay.44  The irony of corporate
41. It should be noted that:
The report . . . was not easy to compile.  Though the Federal Trade Com-
mission was authorized by the United States Senate, and the Supreme
Court via the commerce clause, to investigate corporations and individu-
als engaged in interstate commerce, executives at the companies targeted
were less than willing to cooperate.  After years of operating without gov-
ernment oversight, powerful executives were not ready to concede so
quickly to what they perceived to be a new presidential administration
flexing its muscles.  Consequently, the report was not entirely complete.
Although 877 schedules were returned, “shortly after the returns be-
gan to come in it became obvious that many companies had not included
indirect compensation, that is, amounts paid by subsidiary or affiliated
companies.”  Several companies made incomplete returns; some alleged
that they did not engage in interstate commerce and were thus exempt
from the inquiry; and others refused or neglected to report entirely.
Savarese, supra note 26, at 20–21.
42. See id. at 21 (noting also that “the findings of the Commerce Commission
provided data that allowed scholars to finally study executive compensation
through an academic lens”).
43. See Vagts, supra note 27, at 245–46 (explaining that stock market crash
had “mild[ ] effects” on executive salaries, which remained “stable”); see also Wash-
ington, supra note 9, at 734 (explaining that bonus payments “either ceased or
were sharply reduced”).
44. See MARK LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXA-
TION, 1933–1939 75 (1984) (explaining that some companies grudgingly reduced
salaries of their executives, but others actually increased salaries); Washington,
supra note 9, at 743 (noting that executives were compensated with increased sala-
ries in 1930 and 1931).
It is still not unusual for companies to buffer executives’ compensation from
the vagaries of the economy or stock market. See, e.g., Barris, supra note 5, at 66
(“Many compensation packages are constructed so that the executive profits in
good times and is protected in bad.  If stock prices decline, the executive may lose
his bonus, but he may have the ability to renegotiate the option portion of his
existing plan to lower the strike price, the price at which the option can be exer-
cised.  Thus, the executive is rewarded regardless of his or the corporation’s per-
formance and is simultaneously insulated from the ravages suffered by fellow
shareholders if stock value declines.” (footnote omitted)); Louis Lavelle, Executive
Pay, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 16, 2001, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/con-
10
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executives receiving pay increases to compensate for stock market bonus
losses—while at the same time numerous average Americans were strug-
gling to find work and, if able to do so, a living wage—was apparent to the
general public.45
Resentment toward executives grew considerably.46  Politicians were
eager to capitalize on this public resentment and earn political points by
“castigating the ‘greedy pigs’” committing “robbery” of businesses in their
control.47  Thus, they undertook a number of legislative efforts aimed at
curtailing executive compensation levels.  As briefly discussed below, these
efforts fell into two broad categories: mandated disclosures and salary lim-
its at companies doing business with the government.48  Use of the tax
system to regulate executive compensation was also considered, but ulti-
tent/01_16/b3728013.htm (noting that “in 2000[, w]hile shareholders got ham-
mered, many compensation committees scrambled to cushion their chief
executives from feeling any real pain, granting massive blocks of new stock options
in some cases and in others forgiving corporate loans”).  Nevertheless, on average,
executive pay does tend to contract briefly in response to recessions. See Carola
Frydman & Raven S. Molloy, Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation?  Evidence
from Postwar Tax Reforms (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2009-
30, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200930/
200930pap.pdf; Carola Frydman and Raven E. Saks, Historical Trends in Executive
Compensation (Jan. 18, 2007) (Working Paper), available at http://web.mit.edu/
frydman/www/trends_rfs2010.pdf; LINDA LEVINE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
A COMPARISON OF THE PAY OF TOP EXECUTIVES AND OTHER WORKERS 1 (2004), avail-
able at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181&
context=key_workplace; LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ,
ECON. POLICY INST., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2008/2009 220 (2009).
45. For a discussion of the increasing public awareness of executive compen-
sation, see supra notes 43 and 44; see also Wells, supra note 5, at 709–16 (explaining
that information revealed during early 1930s regarding executive compensation,
salaries and bonus plans, “particularly stung in a period when many were out of
work (unemployment grew to twenty-five percent early [sic] 1933) and wages were
reduced for those with jobs”).
46. See LEFF, supra note 44, at 74–90 (noting subsequently enacted legislation
that was prompted by such public resentment specifically targeted highly paid cor-
porate executives while excluding other highly paid individuals such as doctors,
lawyers, and small businessmen).
47. Id. at 76 (explaining further that Roosevelt administration feared “un-
happy public reaction” if action was not taken); see also Brownstein & Panner, supra
note 5, at 28 (describing Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms designed to confront what
President Roosevelt condemned as “entrenched greed” of corporate managers).
48. For a discussion of the legislative efforts designed to limit executive com-
pensation, see infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. See generally Charles M.
Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 937
(1993); 1 GEORGE T. WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, 2D, COMPENSATING
THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 9 n.32, 10–11 (rev. ed. 1951); LEFF, supra note 44, at
74–90 (discussing legislative efforts to reduce executive compensation levels).
11
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mately dismissed.49  Instead, tax rates were raised on America’s wealthiest
citizens.50
Many policymakers viewed corporate transparency as a natural re-
straint on high levels of executive compensation.51  The theory was that if
49. Some legislative proposals would have imposed additional taxes or special
higher rates of tax on individuals receiving salaries above certain levels. See LEFF,
supra note 44, at 86–87 (discussing various proposals); Joseph J. Thorndike, Too
Much: The Historical Link Between Bailouts and Pay Caps, TAX ANALYSTS, Oct. 6, 2008,
http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/0AE30B4E5C88A2B085257
4DA0051591F?OpenDocument (same).  Conversely, other proposals would have
capped corporate tax deductibility for compensation paid to executives. See id.
None of these proposals were enacted.  However, one reason the proposal to cap
corporate tax deductibility for executive compensation lacked support was that leg-
islators realized that, under the tax laws at that time, any income tax corporations
and shareholders might pay as a result of the proposal was surpassed by the in-
come tax executives would pay on receiving a high level of compensation. See
Washington, supra note 9, at 767 n.105 (recounting congressional determination
of benefit of capping deductibility); see also LEFF, supra note 44, at 88–89 (explain-
ing Congress’s reasoning in rejecting cap).
50. See generally Elson, supra note 48, at 937; WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, supra
note 48, at 9 n.32, 10–11.  For the years immediately preceding and following the
stock market crash of 1929, i.e., from 1925 to 1931, the federal income tax rates
and brackets changed little, with the highest marginal rate reaching 25%. See TAX
FOUND., FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY (2011), available at http:/
/www.taxfoundation.org/files/fed_individual_rate_history_nominal&adjusted-
20110909.pdf. [hereinafter TAX RATES]. This rate applied to taxable income over
$100,000 (approximately $1,292,743 to $1,480,355 in 2011 dollars). See id.  In
1932, and again in 1936, both the federal income tax rates and brackets were sig-
nificantly changed, with the top marginal rate being raised to 63% and 79%, re-
spectively. See id.
It is important to note that, from the inception of the modern income tax in
1913 to the beginning of United States involvement in World War II in 1940, at
most only about 5% of working Americans paid any income tax at all. See Under-
standing Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/app/understand
ingTaxes/teacher/whys_thm02_les05.jsp (last visited May 28, 2012) [hereinafter
Understanding Taxes].  This was due, in large part, to the high exemption level set
by the income tax laws, under which no income tax was due.  Once an individual’s
taxable income rose above the exemption level, the tax rate structure was progres-
sive.  The individual federal income tax system did not become more broadly ap-
plicable until the Revenue Act of 1942. See id.  Thereafter, approximately fifty to
seventy-five percent of American workers paid federal income tax. See id. (detail-
ing history of U.S. tax system).
51. See John W. Head, The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 in Context—Re-
flections on International Legal and Institutional Failings, “Fixes,” and Fundamentals, 23
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 43, 95 (2010) (stating 1933 began “reli-
ance on transparency to guard against financial chaos on the theory that supplying
players in the marketplace . . . would guard against chaos and crisis”); see also LEFF,
supra note 44, at 76–77 (quoting politicians at that time expounding on impor-
tance of salary publicity); Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensa-
tion—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 284 (2007) (stating disclosure
legislation reflected ideal that “ ‘sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants, elec-
tric light the most efficient policeman’” (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEO-
PLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1933))); Wells supra note 5, at 744
(noting legislative history related to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 cited reduced
compensation as legislative goal of increased disclosure).
12
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pay packages were readily available for public inspection, then corpora-
tions would somehow be shamed into paying their executives less.52  Or,
put differently, corporations would be deterred from paying overly large
compensation packages.  The most significant disclosure legislation—in-
deed, the most enduring legislation from the Great Depression era regu-
lating executive compensation—was the enactment of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.53  Through the latter Act,
Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  As
part of the SEC’s mission “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation,” the SEC administers
the securities laws, which require disclosure of executive compensation
packages.54
52. See LEFF, supra note 44, at 76–80 (discussing salary publicity as governmen-
tal attempt to attack corporate salaries); Peter V. Letsou, The Changing Face of Corpo-
rate Governance Regulation in the United States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State
Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 149, 176 (2009) (suggesting plain language of
Securities Exchange Act reflects aim of “shaming” corporations); see also Markham,
supra note 51, at 278 (suggesting disclosure regulations designed “to shame execu-
tives into accepting lower compensation” but arguing these efforts actually fueled
excess salaries).
53. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a-77m (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78nn (2006)).  A disclosure provision was also enacted
as part of the Revenue Act of 1934.  The Act ordered the Treasury Department to
provide Congress with a list identifying the names and corporate salaries of em-
ployees receiving more than $15,000 annually (approximately $253,243 in today’s
dollars). See LEFF, supra note 44, at 77; see also Brownstein & Panner, supra note 5,
at 28.  The $15,000 floor was raised to $75,000 annually in 1938 (approximately
$1,203,351 in today’s dollars) before this form of salary publicity was repealed in
1949. See LEFF, supra note 44, at 80.  Congress generally forwarded this informa-
tion, extracted from corporate income tax returns, to the press, which in turn
made the information public—though the press often only provided incomplete
accounts to the public. See Washington, supra note 9, at 765 n.102.  Although more
straightforward than disclosures made to the SEC, this provision was duplicative of
the disclosure requirements of the newly-created SEC and was eventually repealed
in 1949. See LEFF, supra note 44, at 79.
54. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ-
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
Those subject to disclosure and the content of required disclosures have va-
ried over the years but the legal obligation to disclose continues to this day.  The
most significant amendments to the original executive pay disclosure rules oc-
curred in 1978, 1992, 2006, and 2011.  For a discussion of these amendments, see
infra notes 73, 124, and 131–76.  The efficacy of the disclosure requirements has
been the subject of continual debate.  The potential of disclosure to affect manage-
rial behavior is widely recognized. See Knutt, supra note 35, at 501–02 (discussing
potential effects of disclosure); see also Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securi-
ties Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 245
(1998) (discussing President Roosevelt’s opinion of benefits of corporate trans-
parency).  Nevertheless, some view the ability of SEC disclosure requirements to
deter excessive compensation with skepticism. See Knutt, supra note 35, at 500
(“[F]ederal disclosure . . . regulations have been unable to reduce executive com-
pensation packages.”); see also Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Perform-
ance Compensation in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 157–58
13
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Although policymakers were inclined to believe that public disclosure
of salaries would result in lower overall levels of executive compensation,
Congress did not stop there.  In 1933, Congress also enacted legislation
mandating salary caps as a condition of doing business with the federal
government.55  The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was au-
thorized to deny federal financial assistance to companies providing exec-
utives with salaries the RFC deemed unreasonable, and, with regard to
insurance companies, there was an express salary limit of no more than
$17,50056—$304,797.50 in 2011 dollars.57  Similarly, federal mail con-
(1995) (stating that recent amendments to SEC proxy requirements have had little
effect on compensation); Markham supra, note 51, at 278 (suggesting disclosure
regulations designed “to shame executives into accepting lower compensation” but
arguing these efforts actually fueled excess salaries).  There is also concern about
the extent to which such disclosure fosters a “free rider” syndrome, wherein share-
holders feel secure in their own inactivity, assuming that other shareholders are
monitoring the situation. See Knutt, supra note 35, at 502–03 (discussing potential
for “rational apathy” among investors who may not have time or cognitive ability to
process all disclosed information).
Moreover, in the opinion of some commentators, executives have been re-
sourceful in their attempts both to provide the information in an unclear manner
and to conceal as much as possible while still obeying the rules. See IRA T. KAY,
VALUE AT THE TOP: SOLUTIONS TO THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CRISIS 176 (1992)
(noting that proxy disclosure “has seldom been a model of clarity,” and discussing
corporate counsel’s ability to conceal compensation from proxy disclosure).  To-
day’s concerns often focus not upon a lack of disclosure but on information over-
load resulting in confusion for investors. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
417, 444–62 (2003) (examining potential for information overload in proxy disclo-
sures and arguing that securities regulation has often ignored usefulness of newly
available information).  The SEC has indicated its awareness of the potential for
harm if investors are unable to understand the disclosures. See id.  Responding to
some of these concerns, in 2006, the SEC promulgated new rules that require sim-
plified “plain English” narratives that explain compensation information otherwise
provided in a tabular manner. See Leigh Johnson, et al., Preparing Proxy Statements
Under the SEC’s New Rules Regarding Executive and Director Compensation Disclosures, 7
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 373, 376–78 (2007) (discussing enhanced disclosure require-
ments of 2006 amendments).
55. See LEFF, supra note 44, at 80–87 (discussing congressional attempts to cre-
ate salary ceilings for executives).
56. See id. at 81 (discussing enactment of RFC loan denial legislation).  After
contentious floor debate, Congress passed this more lenient form proffered by the
House Banking and Currency Committee. See id. at 82–83 (same).  Initially, the
measure would have denied federal loans to any corporation paying their execu-
tives more than $17,500 in salary. See id. (same).  Shortly after enactment, the RFC
successfully required salary cuts as a condition for a loan to Southern Pacific Rail-
road. See id. at 82 (recognizing effectiveness of RFC legislation).  Thereafter, the
RFC was more conservative in exercising its regulatory discretion. See id. at 81
(same); Thorndike, supra note 49 (“[I]n later years, Jones used his regulatory dis-
cretion with great discretion; by most accounts, RFC regulation had only a modest
effect on corporate salaries during the Depression.”).
57. The inflation calculation was performed with the inflation calculator pro-
vided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which “uses the average Consumer Price
Index for a given calendar year.” See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited May 29,
14
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tracts were withheld from companies compensating managers in excess of
$17,500 (again, $304,797.50 in 2011 dollars).58  However, these limits are
viewed as having been more symbolic than real, and affected few
executives.59
In sum, information about executive compensation at America’s larg-
est corporations became known amidst an economic depression and re-
cord-holding levels of unemployment.  Significant negative public
sentiment ensued, prompting legislators to take action.  Thus began
America’s foray into regulating executive pay.
C. The Calm Before the Storm: The 1940s-1970s
After the Great Depression era, the United States experienced a pe-
riod of relative economic stability from the 1940s to the early 1970s.60
Many attribute this stability to a steady stream of wars and related wage
and price stabilization laws.61  There were, as always over any period of
time spanning more than a few years, some economic peaks and troughs
(i.e., business cycles represented by periods of expansion followed by con-
traction).62  The official recessions occurring during this time span, as de-
2012) (calculating changes in prices of all goods and services purchased for con-
sumption using average Consumer Price Index for given calendar year).
58. See LEFF, supra note 44, at 81 (discussing initial expansion of air-mail and
ocean-mail to all contracts under 1934 Air Mail Act).  In 1936, Congress raised the
ceiling to salaries in excess of $25,000 (approximately $406,888 in 2011 dollars).
Id.
59. See id.; Thorndike, supra note 49.
60. See generally HALL, supra note 20; ALAN L. SORKIN, MONETARY AND FISCAL
POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE MODERN ERA 57–69 (1988).
61. See HALL, supra note 20, at 163–79 (discussing economic stability during
period from 1940s to early 1970s); see also Vagts, supra note 27, at 245.
62. See HALL, supra note 20, at 4–8 (describing business cycles); SORKIN, supra
note 60, at 11–25 (describing characteristics of business cycle).  This Article relies
on the business cycles determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER). See U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_
Contractions_20100920.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Business Cycles].
Although there are criticisms of NBER’s methodology, NBER is the most com-
monly accepted source for scholars discussing business cycles. See HOWARD J. SHER-
MAN & DAVID X. KOLK, BUSINESS CYCLES AND FORECASTING 41–43 (1997) (discussing
both the criticisms and supremacy of NBER methodology).  A peak, as that term is
used in this Article in reference to a business cycle, refers to the point in time
when aggregate economic activity has stopped rising and starts to fall. See GEOF-
FREY H. MOORE, BUSINESS CYCLES, INFLATION, AND FORECASTING 3–4 (2d ed. 1983)
(defining peak and trough dates); Laurence S. Moss, Burns, Arthur Frank
(1904–1987), in BUSINESS CYCLES AND DEPRESSIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 61 (David
Glasner ed., 1997) (describing Burns’s and Mitchell’s definition of business cycle).
A trough, on the other hand, is when aggregate economic activity has stopped
falling and starts to rise. See Moss, supra, at 61 (explaining Burns’s and Mitchell’s
definition of “reference dates”: peaks and troughs in aggregate economic activity);
MOORE, supra, at 3 (“[T]rough dates mark the end of a period of contraction and
the beginning of a period of expansion.”).  Although it is possible to measure a
business cycle from peak to peak, the most common method is to measure from
15
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termined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), were
nevertheless relatively minor in comparison both to the Great Depression
as well as the recessions that would follow in the mid-1970s, early 1980s,
early 1990s, and 2000s.63
The most significant economic downturn during this period occurred
during 1973 to 1975.64  Following that recession, the economy went
through a period of expansion lasting from the end of 1975 to 1979.65
Although this was one of the longest expansions in U.S. history up to that
point in time, the public was still very dissatisfied with the economy be-
cause of high inflation, an increased unemployment rate, and slow wage
growth.66
Reflective of the relative economic stability of this era was the unem-
ployment rate.  Coming out of the Great Depression era, the unemploy-
ment rate was 14.6% in 1940.67  That rate dropped significantly in 1941 to
9.9%, and by 1943 had declined dramatically to 1.9%.68  Thereafter, the
unemployment rate mostly oscillated between 3.0% and 5.9% until 1975
one trough to the next. See HOWARD J. SHERMAN, THE BUSINESS CYCLE: GROWTH
AND CRISIS UNDER CAPITALISM 11 (1991) (“One could measure peak to peak, but
that is not as convenient for illustrating most theories of the business cycle, so this
book uses trough-to-trough cycles exclusively.”).  Thus, the first phase of a business
cycle, occurring after the initial trough, is an upturn that is called the recovery. See
id. (explaining meaning of recovery or revival).  This is followed by a further ex-
pansion that is called the prosperity, which subsequently turns into a crisis after
the peak. See id. (explaining concepts of prosperity and crisis).  Finally, the crisis
turns into a contraction that is called a recession or depression. See id. (explaining
meaning of recession—a mild depression—and depression, and noting that au-
thor prefers uniform use of term “depression” for all contractions).  Note, how-
ever, that while the time from trough to trough determines the duration of a
business cycle, the amplitude and scope are what determine whether it is consid-
ered a recession. See MOORE, supra, at 4 (explaining characteristics of business
cycles).  For more on amplitude and scope, as well as the determination of busi-
ness cycles, see generally MOORE, supra, and SHERMAN, supra.
63. See SORKIN, supra note 60, at 63–64, 102 (explaining why recessions during
this time period were not severe).  The most significant economic downturn dur-
ing the 1940s to 1970s occurred in 1973–1975. See HALL, supra note 20, at 176
(stating timeframe and severity of recession).  Following that recession, the econ-
omy went through a period of expansion lasting from the fourth quarter of 1975 to
1979. See id. at 177 (discussing expansionary period); see also SORKIN, supra note 60,
at 68 (discussing beginning of recovery in fourth quarter of 1975).  Although this
was one of the longest expansions in U.S. history up to that point in time, the
public was still very dissatisfied with the economy because of high inflation, an
increased unemployment rate, and slow wage growth. See HALL, supra note 20, at
177 (explaining public dissatisfaction despite fifty-eight month long expansion).
64. See HALL, supra note 20, at 176 (stating timeframe and severity of
recession).
65. See id. at 177 (discussing expansionary period); see also SORKIN, supra note
60, at 68 (discussing beginning of recovery in fourth quarter of 1975).
66. See HALL, supra note 20, at 177 (explaining public dissatisfaction despite
fifty-eight month long expansion).
67. See infra Appendix.
68. See id.
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when it rose sharply for one year to 8.5%.69  For the rest of the late 1970s,
it settled between 5.8 and 7.7%.70
During this time period, intense public scrutiny of executive compen-
sation levels was also quiescent.71  There were no high profile executive
pay controversies capturing media or public attention.  Compared to sub-
sequent time periods, media reporting on executive pay matters was mini-
mal.72  So, too, was congressional attention.73
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Elson, supra note 48, at 939 (noting that after Great Depression era
executive compensation issues “lay dormant until the perceived salary excesses of
the late 1980s revived public interest and debate”); E´rica Gorga, Culture and Corpo-
rate Law Reform: A Case Study of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 803, 874 (2006)
(crediting New Deal and noting that corporations of 1960s behaved more like “so-
cialist republics” than “cutthroat capitalist enterprises”).
Some corporate governance scholars attribute this in part to the effect of the
steeply progressive tax rate structure, in addition to other factors, on executive
compensation levels. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 48, at 938–39 (“With the judiciary a
reluctant venue for compensation reform, Congress attempted to resolve the issue
by dramatically raising the income taxation rates imposed on those receiving the
greatest compensation.”); see also, e.g., Barris, supra note 5, at 62 (“Although the
government refused to directly control private sector compensation, it did devise a
way in through the back door—redistributing wealth through taxation. . . .  While
the average executive earned considerably more than the average worker, his pro-
portionally higher tax rate significantly reduced the disparity.  Furthermore, the
futility of awarding huge salaries only to see them swallowed up by taxes helped to
keep salaries lower.”).
While “[o]nly a handful of studies have examined the influence of tax policy
on managerial pay empirically, [ ] none have found a significant effect of taxation
on the level or structure of pay.”  Frydman & Molloy, supra note 44, at 1.  In 2009,
two scholars in the field of economics, Carola Frydman and Raven S. Molloy, un-
dertook a more comprehensive study and reached similar conclusions. See id.
Their study found that there was “no evidence that changes in tax rates apprecia-
bly affect the level or structure of executive compensation.” Id. at 20.  Frydman
and Molloy do note, however, that their “results do not imply that tax policy has
not affected any aspect of executive pay,” noting, for example, that “high tax rates
in the 1950s and 1960s might have spurred the adoption of pensions, perks and
qualified stock options, even though the use of these benefits did not decrease as
their tax advantage diminished over time.” Id. at 26.  Conversely, there are those
who attribute lower income tax rates to the overall growth in income inequality
over the last forty years. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and
Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 993 (2004) (discussing effect of income tax
rates on growth in income inequality).
72. For example, based on February 22, 2011 search results performed on
Lexisnexis.com for the N.Y. Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles
Times for “executive compensation,” only 63 articles regarding executive compen-
sation were published in major U.S. newspapers between 1940 and 1949—a
marked decrease from the 238 articles published in the 1930s.  There were seventy-
nine articles published regarding executive compensation in the 1950s, a slight
increase from the 1940s.  In the 1960s, there were sixty-five news articles published
regarding executive compensation, a slight decrease from the 1950s.  Lastly, the
1970s saw the most significant increase in articles published regarding executive
compensation: 204.
73. During the 1950s, Congress did enact tax rules regarding stock options, a
common component of executive pay packages.  These actions, however, were de-
17
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The dormancy in focus on executive compensation issues coincided
with fairly static executive compensation levels in comparison to the pay of
an average worker.74  This executive pay to worker pay ratio is sometimes
looked to as an indication of the “alleged unfairness of the corporate wage
structure.”75  The earliest time period for which pay ratios can be or have
been calculated is the mid-1930s, although most pay ratio data typically
begins in the 1960s.76  By one estimate, in 1936-1939, the pay ratio was
eighty-two.77  Thus, executives made, on average, eighty-two times the
amount of pay an average worker received.  In the 1940s, the ratio con-
tracted, reflecting “a sharp decline in the real value of pay during World
War II,” followed by a “sluggish rate” of growth for the next thirty years.78
Thus, throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the executive to average
worker pay ratio largely hovered in the range of forty to fifty.  In the 1970s,
“executive earnings began to rise faster than those of the average worker,”
leading to a pay ratio of sixty-nine heading into the 1980s.79  Another
source, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), provides different ratio
amounts, but reveals the same trend: from 1965 to the mid-1970s the ratio
hovered in the twenties, but rose to thirty-five for 1978.80  In any event,
although the actual numbers may differ, varied sources agree that the pay
ratio was relatively steady until the 1970s, and was certainly steady in com-
parison to the rapidly upward movements that began in the late 1970s
continuing to the present day.81
liberately favorable to executives and led to executive pay increases. See Bruce R.
Ellig, The Evolution of Executive Pay in the United States, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS
REV., Feb. 2006, at 55, 55–59 (2006); Frydman & Molloy, supra note 44, at 11–14.
In the 1960s, Congress reduced but did not eliminate the preferential tax status of
some stock options. See id.
In the late 1970s, executive perquisites (or perks) were receiving increased
negative attention and Congress considered taking action to curb perceived
abuses.  The SEC, however, moved first and significantly amended the pay disclo-
sure rules to require tabular disclosures with a column for perks. See Kathleen T.
McGahran, SEC Disclosure Regulation and Management Perquisites, ACCT. REV., Jan.
1988, at 23, 23.  The SEC also clarified which perks needed to be disclosed as
compensation in company proxy statements. See id.
74. As recognized above, some corporate governance scholars would attribute
the stability of executive pay levels in part to the high marginal income tax rate
that prevailed until rates were significantly lowered during the 1980s, but thus far
the economic studies that have been conducted to analyze the effects of tax rates
on executive pay levels are not in accord with that conclusion.
75. See LEVINE, supra note 44, at 1.
76. See Frydman & Saks, supra note 44, at 2 (explaining that “very little is
known about the compensation arrangements of corporate officers prior to
[1980]”).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 9.
80. See MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 44.
81. A reasonable question is whether pay regulation is merely a result of esca-
lating pay levels in comparison to the pay of average workers.  As discussed above,
while executive pay levels are certainly not irrelevant, they do not alone explain
18
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D. A Hiccup: The 1980s
The overall stability of the 1940s-1970s came to an end in the 1980s.
The economy peaked in 1980 and was followed by a widely expected reces-
sion.82  The recession and a weak recovery persisted until 1984.83  There-
after, but for the brief stock market crash in October of 1987, the
economy remained stable until 1990.84
Not surprisingly, the unemployment rate followed the same path.
Heading into the 1980s, the unemployment rate was 5.8% for 1979.85  The
rate peaked in 1982 and 1983 at 9.7% and 9.6%, respectively.86  Thereaf-
ter, the unemployment rate dropped back down to 7.5% in 1984, steadily
declining to 5.3% by 1989.87
In addition to a more turbulent economic climate, the decade of the
1980s was significant for its heightened level of merger and acquisition
activity.88 In particular, the high profile takeover of Bendix Corporation in
1982 garnered widespread media attention—as well as scrutiny from the
SEC and ultimately Congress—and highlighted a new form of executive
pay.89
the occurrence of regulation of executive pay.  Pay trends in the socio-political
context of the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, show that the public displays signifi-
cantly less concern and interest in executive pay, even as it increases dramatically,
so long as the economy is doing well, jobs abound, and there are no significant pay
controversies to catalyze public sentiment.
82. See Business Cycles, supra note 62; HALL, supra note 20, at 180 (discussing
beginning of 1980 recession).
83. See Business Cycles, supra note 62; SORKIN, supra note 60, at 70.
84. See Business Cycles, supra note 62; HALL, supra note 20, at 184–85 (discuss-
ing economy in 1984 and stock market crash in 1987).
85. See infra Appendix.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 199
(Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter DEFRA BLUE BOOK], available at http://www.jct.
gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3343 (referring to heightened merger
and acquisition activity of early 1980s); Peter L. Coffey, Golden Parachutes: A Perk
that Boards Should Scrutinize Carefully, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984) (noting
abundance and value of merger transactions in 1981); Kenneth C. Johnson, Note,
Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review,
94 YALE L.J. 909, 916 (1985) (explaining rationale of using certain agreements as
reasonable response “for dealing with the disequilibrium caused by increased take-
over activity”); David V. Maurer, Golden Parachutes—Executive Compensation or Execu-
tive Overreaching?, 9 J. CORP. L. 346, 346 (1984) (attributing abundance of
parachute provisions to increased merger activity and noting that golden
parachutes were “practically unheard of ten years [prior]”); Richard P. Bress,
Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 957–58
(1987) (“Golden parachutes became popular during a period of unprecedented
takeover activity as a means of providing senior executives with enhanced security.”
(footnote omitted)).
89. See Coffey, supra note 88, at 294–95 (summarizing Bendix-Marietta battle
and noting after effects of that confrontation).
19
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The tale of the Bendix merger began with the company’s chairman
announcing a $1.5 billion takeover bid for Martin Marietta Corporation.90
While Bendix was obtaining control of Martin Marietta, however, Martin
Marietta was acquiring control of Bendix with the assistance of a third
company, United Technologies Corporation.91  Bendix responded by
merging with yet another company, Allied Corporation, “[t]o avoid a dis-
astrous situation in which [Bendix and Martin Marietta] in effect owned
[each] other . . . .”92
The Bendix merger was costly.  Both Martin Marietta and Allied Cor-
poration significantly increased their debt burdens to fund their acquisi-
tive activities.93  This left the companies in a very different, arguably worse,
financial position.94  “When the action subsided, the takeover, and those
who orchestrated it, [were] harshly criticized.”95  One aspect of that criti-
cism focused heavily on golden parachutes, a component of the compen-
sation paid to the executives of both Bendix and Martin Marietta that
protected them, in a sense, throughout the takeover process from their
actions and the outcome.96  In the aftermath of the Bendix merger con-
troversy, golden parachutes became the subject of intense examination
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 294 (quoting William Agee, Corporate Mergers’ Value, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1982, at A31).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 294.
96. Id. at 294–95. A golden parachute refers to a severance agreement paya-
ble to a company’s executives in the event of a change in the control of the com-
pany. See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006); see also William R. Spalding, Golden
Parachutes: Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117, 1117–22
(1983) (explaining golden parachute agreements).  Generally, these agreements
are quite lucrative, promising aggregate payments worth more than several times
the executive’s annual income, in addition to other benefits, should the executive
voluntarily or involuntarily leave the company as a result of a change in corporate
control. See id. (same); Susan Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive
Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 88–89 (1998) (same).  For more on the
panoply of benefits, variety of terms, and tax consequences of golden parachute
agreements, see generally BILL C. WILSON & DIANE M. MCGOWAN, GOLDEN
PARACHUTES 396 (2008).
20
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and debate.97  Professionals and academics alike called for the govern-
ment to intervene.98
Congress first considered proposals to directly prohibit the adoption
of parachute contracts under certain circumstances, such as when they are
created after the commencement of a tender offer.99  Ultimately, though,
in 1984 Congress decided to use the tax system to try to affect corporate
and executive behavior regarding parachute agreements.  Congress en-
acted sections 280G and 4999, two tax penalty provisions that are designed
to work synergistically to discourage parachute payments above a defined
level.100  Section 280G does its part by prohibiting companies from taking
97. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue
Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, 35 VILL. L. REV. 131, 134,
148–49 (1990) (noting that golden parachutes were among most hotly contested
issues surrounding takeover wave of 1980s); Henry F. Johnson, Those “Golden Para-
chute” Agreements: The Taxman Cuts the Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 48, 56 (1985)
(commenting that “[t]he opinions are lining up on either side of the issue as to
whether [golden parachutes] are beneficial or detrimental to the concern’s future
existence,” and “commentators have been unable to agree on the validity and use-
fulness of golden parachute[s]”); Spalding, supra note 96, at 1121–22 (noting de-
bate over propriety in spite of parachute popularity).
98. See DEFRA BLUE BOOK, supra note 88 (explaining that golden parachute
legislation was enacted in response to recent wave of mergers and acquisitions that
had raised alarm among Congress and professionals).
99. See Allen E. Kelinsky, Comment, Promoting Shareholder Equality in Stock Ac-
cumulation Programs for Corporate Control, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 93, 120 (1986) (recount-
ing regulatory and legislative history of proposal to ban parachutes created during
tender offers); see also Statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Concerning the Recommendation of the SEC Advisory
Committee on Tender Offers, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 83,511, at 86,681 (Mar. 28, 1984) (setting forth Advisory Committee pro-
posal to ban parachutes created during tender offers and stating SEC’s support);
Bruce Ingersoll, Some Takeover Defenses Barred by House Panel—Measure Would Ban
“Golden Parachutes” and Restrict “Greenmail” by Targets, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1984
(recounting House subcommittee’s unanimous vote to follow SEC’s  recommenda-
tion to prohibit “wide range of defensive tactics” in merger battles, including ban-
ning parachutes created during tender offers).
100. See I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (2006); see also, e.g., Jamie Dietrich Hankinson,
Comment, Golden Parachute Tax Provisions Fall Flat: Tax Gross-Ups Soften Their Impact
to Executives and Square D Overinflates Their Coverage, 34 STETSON. L. REV. 767, 778
(2005) (noting that Congress intended golden parachute provisions to work to-
gether to reduce largesse of golden parachutes); Stabile, supra note 96, at 91 (com-
menting that golden parachute provisions were expected “to make excessive
parachute payments financially prohibitive” for companies and their executives).
It should be noted that sections 280G and 4999 only apply with regard to a limited
group of individuals.  This group is comprised of employees and independent con-
tractors who are also a shareholder, an officer, or a highly-compensated individual.
See § 280G(c).  A highly-compensated individual is defined as one “who is (or
would be if the individual were an employee) a member of the group consisting of
the highest paid 1 percent of the employees of the corporation or, if less, the
highest paid 250 employees of the corporation.” Id. § 280G(c)(2)  The targeted
group is further limited in that the golden parachute provisions do not apply to
payments made by a small business company (as defined in § 1361(b) but without
regard to paragraph (1)(C)) or by a company whose stock is not readily tradable
21
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a deduction for any excess parachute payment it makes to an executive.101
Section 4999, in turn, imposes a twenty percent tax on any person who
receives an excess parachute payment.102  Thus, together they increase the
after-tax cost for both the company paying and the executive receiving
such payments.103
The acquisitive activity of the early 1980s both proliferated and
brought to light a new aspect of executive compensation: the golden para-
chute.  At the same time that golden parachutes were being demanded
and received by many executives as part of their compensation packages,
executive compensation levels in general started to climb.  During the
1980s, executive pay suddenly grew at a pace nearly four times that of the
average worker.104  As a result, the disparity between executive and worker
and three-quarters of the shareholders have approved the payments. See
§ 280G(b)(5).
101. See § 280G.  An excess parachute payment is present when a golden para-
chute agreement provides for payments equal to or greater than three times a base
amount, which is determined with reference to the executive’s average annual tax-
able compensation.  § 280G(a)-(b), (d).  For more information on the tax conse-
quences of excess parachute payments, see generally Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence
and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 485, 515–19 (2009).
In the absence of § 280G and prior to the enactment of § 162(m) in 1993,
golden parachute payments were fully deductible by the paying company so long
as such payments were reasonable compensation paid to executives for services
rendered within the meaning of § 162(a)(1). See id. at 514 n.113 (discussing inter-
pretation and application of § 162(a)(1)).
102. See § 4999.  The company must withhold the 20% penalty tax from its
payment to the executive. See  § 4999(c)(1).  A deduction for the amount of the
penalty tax is also specifically disallowed. See § 275(a)(6).
103. For numeric examples of these cost effects, see Mullane, supra note 101,
at 515–19.  It should be noted that the golden parachute tax penalty provisions
have been the subject of much criticism for being ineffective and counterproduc-
tive. See, e.g., Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing
Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 410, 417 (2008) (noting
limited effectiveness of section 280G); Stabile, supra note 96, at 93 (“[N]either with
respect to ordinary compensation nor with respect to compensation contingent on
a change in control has the Code proven a very meaningful curb on executive
compensation.”); Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?,
21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 181 (2001) (arguing for repeal of golden parachute provi-
sions because they “not only allow[ ] golden chutes to flourish, but achieve[ ] this
counter-productive result in a complex and costly fashion”); Zelinsky, supra note
97, at 160, 187–92 (concluding, in part, that golden chute provisions—§§ 280G
and 4999—”satisfy none of the tests for identifying an appropriate tax provision”);
Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to
Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1675
(2004) (concluding “the federal government will not be successful in capping ex-
ecutive compensation by providing disincentives through the tax code”); Hankin-
son, supra note 100, at 783–89 n.108–46 (highlighting examples of ways sections
280G and 4999 can be circumvented).
104. See MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK
§ 4:1 (2006) (noting that during 1980s, executive salaries increased by average of
212%, while worker salaries increased by average of just 53%); Barris, supra note 5,
at 62 (explaining that in 1990 executives were earning eighty-five times salary of
22
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salaries doubled during the 1980s.  According to EPI’s calculations, in
1978 the pay ratio was thirty-five, and by 1989 it had risen to seventy-
one.105  Nevertheless, this growth was modest compared to the latter half
of the 1990s.
E. The First Great Debate Since The Great Depression: The 1990s
The 1990s began with a brief recession.106  By late 1991, however, the
economy was turning around and continually expanded for the remainder
of the decade.107  The unemployment rate, which was at 5.6% in 1990, hit
its peak in 1992 when it reached 7.5%.108  Thereafter, the unemployment
rate steadily declined, and was 4.2% in 1999.109
The recession of the early 1990s pushed executive salaries to the fore-
front of national news coverage.110  Media coverage of the troubling times
highlighted the sharp contrast between the situation of highly-paid execu-
tives and that of ordinary Americans.111  During 1991, executive compen-
sation levels received unprecedented media coverage on all the major
television news shows and in business magazines.112
Even so, controversy over executive pay did not explode until the me-
dia covered a trip President Bush made to Japan in 1992 to seek trade
concessions.113  A group of prominent American executives was traveling
average factory worker, up from forty-two times salary of average wage-earner at
beginning of decade); Vagts, supra note 27, at 246.
105. See MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 44. See also Frydman &
Molloy, supra note 44.
106. See Business Cycles, supra note 62; see also CRYSTAL, supra note 18, at 23
(explaining that “the financial boom of the 1980s went bust in a painful recession
in 1990 and 1991”).
107. See Business Cycles, supra note 62.
108. See infra Appendix.
109. See infra Appendix.
110. See Brownstein & Panner, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that recession had
turned executive compensation into “a front-page story”); Murphy, supra note 6, at
713 (recounting media fixation on executive compensation and explaining that
issue reached “national prominence” during 1991).
111. See DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: HOW EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSION-
ALS ARE PAID AND HOW IT AFFECTS AMERICA 95 (1993) (recounting media descrip-
tions of executive salaries as “ ‘mind-numbing,’” and “‘eye-popping,’” and noting
that “[b]y 1990, almost everyone seemed to agree that executive pay had reached
unseemly heights”); Brownstein & Panner, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that public
“can’t help but notice the sharp contrast” between highly-paid executives and
troubling economic realities of recession).
112. See supra notes 109–10 (noting unprecedented level of media coverage
on executive compensation); see also Murphy, supra note 6, at 713 (stating that in
1991 the three major network newscasts featured stories on executive compensa-
tion, as did CNN, 60 Minutes, and Nightline).
113. Murphy, supra note 6, at 713 (recalling that controversy “exploded” in
aftermath of President Bush’s trip to Japan); Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate
Officer’s Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic law of Executive Compensation, 17 J.
CORP. L. 785, 788 (1992) (noting that within weeks following President Bush’s trip
to Japan, several newspapers noted executive compensation had become big issue
23
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with the President, and the media aptly observed that, despite a flagging
economy, American executives were earning salaries in gross dispropor-
tion to those of their highly productive Japanese counterparts.114  With
many Americans out of work, this coverage intensified the public’s resent-
ment of executives and their pay.115  By mid-1992, Americans were con-
vinced that executive compensation lay at the heart of the country’s
economic woes.116  Indeed, one study found that Americans believed that
executive compensation practices were the “prime culprit in the loss of
U.S. jobs during the past decade.”117
In light of the foregoing, executive compensation was at the forefront
of 1992 presidential campaign issues.118  Indeed, so deep was public re-
sentment of large executive compensation packages that candidates from
both parties publicly decried executive excesses.119  For example, then-
Governor Bill Clinton called for a stronger relationship between pay and
performance:
It’s wrong for executives to do what so many did in the 1980s . . . .
The biggest companies raised their [CEOs’] pay by four times
the percentage their workers’ pay went up, and three times the
percentage their profits went up. . . .  For America to be more
competitive, there must be a stronger link between our execu-
tives’ pay and performance.120
with Fortune writing, “[t]he issue of [executive] pay has finally landed on the na-
tional agenda and won’t be leaving soon” (quoting Geoffrey Colvin, How to Pay the
CEO Right, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 61)).
114. See, e.g., Jill Abramson & Christopher J. Chipello, Compensation Gap: High
Pay of CEOs Traveling with Bush Touches a Nerve in Asia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1991, at
A1 (detailing mounting tensions one week before President Bush and executives
arrived in Japan, and noting that despite American economic downturn, execu-
tives traveling with Bush earned average of $2 million in previous year, while Japa-
nese executives earned average of $300,000–$400,000).
115. See supra note 111 (noting public resentment of exorbitant executive pay
during economic recession).
116. See Jill Dutt, Study Shows Anger Over Executives’ Pay, NEWSDAY, Jul. 1, 1992,
at B42 (commenting on American belief that executive pay was key economic
issue).
117. Id.  Note that in the same article, an economist was interviewed and de-
scribed the country’s anger towards highly paid executives as “misplaced” and “dis-
turbing.” Id.
118. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Campaign ‘92: From Quayle to Clinton, Politicians
Are Pouncing on the Hot Issue of Top Executives’ Hefty Salaries, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
1992, at A14 (noting that one Republican strategist referred to issue as “politi-
cal . . . dynamite”); see also Thomas McCarroll, Executive Pay, TIME, May 4, 1992
(referring to executive compensation as “populist issue that no politician can
resist”).
119. See Birnbaum, supra note 118 (stating that Vice President Quayle and
Governor Bill Clinton agreed that executive salaries were “too high,” and report-
ing on number of republicans and democrats espousing similar views).
120. Kevin G. Salwen, Clinton Backs Executive Pay Set by Holders, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 1992, at C1 (quoting Clinton).
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Congress likewise was responsive to the public’s resentment of execu-
tive compensation.  Throughout 1991 to 1993, Congress conducted hear-
ings, and several congressmen submitted legislative proposals designed to
rein-in or shape compensation.121  The leading proposals sought to im-
pose some form of limit on corporate deductibility of compensation paid
to executives.  For example, one plan aimed to bring executive and worker
salaries into better proportion by capping deductibility of executive com-
pensation at no more than twenty-five times the salary of the lowest-paid
company employee.122  Others sought to tie executive pay more closely to
corporate performance by denying a deduction for pay unrelated to per-
formance in excess of varying amounts.123
In the end, in 1993, Congress enacted section 162(m), a tax penalty
provision designed to encourage companies to limit executive pay unre-
lated to performance.  Thus, it disallows, subject to exceptions, a deduc-
tion in excess of $1 million for annual compensation paid by a publicly
held corporation to its CEO and the three other highest paid officers at
the company.124  The most significant exception to the deduction limita-
121. A search of lexiscongressional.com performed on June 28, 2011 for “ex-
ecutive compensation” finds that there were seven hearings regarding executive
compensation during this time frame, as compared with none in the six immedi-
ately preceding years.
122. See 137 CONG. REC. E2727 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Martin Sabo) (supporting Income Disparities Act—legislation designed to cap de-
ductibility of executive compensation at no more than twenty-five times salary of
lowest-paid employee in company).
123. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S2328-29 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1992) (statement of
Sen. Harkin) (advocating for stockholders’ right to vote directly on executive com-
pensation, and seeking to amend section 162 of Internal Revenue Code to define
reasonable compensation as nothing over $500,000).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(1), (2) (2006); see also § 162(m)(3).  Section
162(m)(3) defines a “covered employee” and should be interpreted consistently
with I.R.S. Notice 2007-49 and Internal Revenue Bulletin 2007-25.  For purposes of
§ 162(m), a publicly held corporation is “any corporation issuing any class of com-
mon equity securities required to be registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.”  § 162(m)(2).
Section 162(m) modifies the general rule of section 162(a)(1), which nor-
mally allows a company to deduct any reasonable compensation paid to its employ-
ees for services rendered. See § 162(a)(1); see also Mullane, supra note 101, at
506–09 (discussing interpretation and application of section 162(a)(1)).  In 1992,
prior to enactment of section 162(m), the SEC also responded to public sentiment
by again amending the pay disclosure rules. See Executive Compensation Disclo-
sure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229,
240, and 249) (amending executive compensation disclosure requirements).  This
time the SEC required disclosures to include a table summarizing executive pay
components over a three-year period, and adding more tabular disclosures regard-
ing stock options. See id.; see also Michael E. Ragsdale, Comment, Executive Compen-
sation: Will the New SEC Disclosure Rules Control “Excessive” Pay at the Top?, 61 UMKC
L. REV. 537, 544 (1993).  These changes, among others, were intended to make
pay disclosures more comprehensible for shareholders. See id.
25
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tion is for compensation that is tied to performance—there is no limit to
the amount of performance-based compensation that can be deducted.125
Following the enactment of section 162(m), the gap between execu-
tive pay and the pay of the average worker grew considerably, at a pace
outmatched by any prior period since executive pay levels were revealed
during the Great Depression.126  Executive pay did decline marginally in
125. See § 162(m)(4)(C).  One author has referred to this exception as “a
loophole large enough to fly a private jet through.” FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS
GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 156 (2003).
This is because the performance-based exception is very easy to satisfy, rendering
the $1 million deduction limit “virtually meaningless.” Stabile, supra note 96, at 88.
For more on the parameters of the performance-based compensation exception,
see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e) (1996).  Other exceptions to the $1 million deduct-
ibility limit are listed in § 162(m)(4).
Section 162(m), like earlier executive compensation tax penalty provisions,
has been the subject of significant criticism for being ineffective and leading to
negative unintended consequences. See, e.g., Meredith R. Conway, supra note 103,
at 410, 417 (noting ineffectiveness of section 162(m)); Mullane, supra note 101, at
522–26 (explaining ineffectiveness and recounting unintended consequences);
Polsky, supra note 17, at 884 (concluding that section 162(m) is likely ineffective
provision); Stabile, supra note 96, at 94–100 (concluding that section 162(m) is
ineffective at controlling executive compensation and discussing unintended con-
sequences); Miske, supra note 103, at 1680 (concluding Congress cannot effectively
limit executive compensation by using Code to provide disincentives).
126. See MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 44; see also CEO Compensa-
tion in the Post-Enron Era: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
108th Cong. 10 (2003) [hereinafter CEO Compensation Hearing] (statement of Brian
Hall, Associate Professor, Harvard Business School), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg97981/html/CHRG-108shrg97981.htm (“[T]he pay
trend . . . makes it look as if [162(m) was] passed with the intention of accelerat-
ing, not curbing, CEO pay increases.”).  This has been attributed in part to section
162(m)’s emphasis on performance-based pay. See, e.g., Executive Compensation:
Backdating to the Future: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate Library), available at http://fi-
nance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/090606testnm.pdf (“When the tax code was
changed to prevent executive compensation of over $1 million to be deducted
unless it was tied to performance . . . .  [E]veryone got boat-loads of options.  The
very definition of a ‘mega-grant’ had to be changed, so it now can be as much as
eight times the CEO’s base pay and bonus.”); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSA-
TION 2 (Comm. Print. 2006), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?
func=startdown&id=1482 (“Studies have indicated that the deduction limitation
may have led to some substitution away from salary compensation toward perform-
ance-based compensation, but that growth in overall executive compensation has
not been reduced.”); PARTNOY, supra note 125, at 157 (“FASB officials knew that
the $1 million cap on non-performance-based pay would lead companies to switch
to stock options.”); Polsky, supra note 17; James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incen-
tives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 708–09
(1997). But see Lora Cicconi, Blaming the Tax Code for the Backdating Scandal, 114
TAX NOTES 1129, 1140 (2007).  Such pay is often determined with reference to
changes in the company’s stock price, with the most quintessential form of per-
formance-based pay being the stock option. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 6, at 738;
Polsky, supra note 17, at 889–90; PARTNOY, supra note 125, at 156.  Note that only
stock options with an exercise price at or above the market price on the date of
grant qualify. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1996).  Stock prices in gen-
26
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1993 and 1994 coincident with the recession, but thereafter pay levels rose
sharply for the rest of the decade.127  As mentioned above, according to
EPI’s calculations, the CEO pay ratio was seventy-one in 1989.128  It rose to
248 by 1999.129  Once again, calculations performed by others reveal the
same trend of steeply escalating pay during the 1990s.130
F. A Decade of Controversy: The 2000s
The 2000s began with a relatively low (by historic standards) unem-
ployment rate of 4%: 1969 was the last time it was any lower.131  Another
recession, however, began in 2001.132  Although the 2001 recession offi-
cially only lasted roughly eight months, with it came a small rise in the
unemployment rate, which hit 6% in 2003 before it began to descend.133
After the 2001 recession ended, the economy modestly expanded until the
financial sector of the economy began melting down in 2008.134  In 2010,
the unemployment rate hit a comparatively high 9.6%, up from 4.6% just
a few years before in 2006 and 2007.135
Significantly, this decade was marked by two separate and distinct pe-
riods of high profile scandals that coincided with the 2001 and 2008 eco-
nomic disturbances.  In the early 2000s, the media exposed serious
accounting scandals at a number of major corporations, including Enron
Corporation, Tyco International, and WorldCom.136  In the latter half of
eral began rising around the same time that stock options became a more signifi-
cant component of an executive’s compensation package. See Ellig, supra note 73;
Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2003).  Thus,
the stock market boom inured to the benefit of executives receiving hefty stock
option awards.
127. See MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 44.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Frydman & Saks, supra note 44; LEVINE, supra note 44.
131. See infra Appendix.
132. See Business Cycles, supra note 62.
133. See infra Appendix; Business Cycles, supra note 62.
134. See Business Cycles, supra note 62.
135. See infra Appendix.
136. See Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree
in its Proper Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 348–49 (2006) (“[E]xecutive pensions
became front-page news with the collapse of Enron Corporation.”); William A.
Drennan, Enron-Inspired Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Rules: “If You Don’t Know
Where You’re Going, You Might Not Get There.”, 73 TENN. L. REV. 415, 417–18 (2006)
(noting that scandals surrounding “Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco,
HealthSouth, and others” were met with large amounts of publicity and that such
publicity “created an environment conducive to fundamental reforms in . . . corpo-
rate governance”); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred
Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 571 (2007) (referring to executive pay as “topic
of significant interest” for academics, journalists, and legislators in aftermath of
scandals surrounding Enron and New York Stock Exchange Chairman Richard
Grasso).
27
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the decade, the problems facing some of the nation’s largest financial in-
stitutions captured national attention.
1. The First Wave
When the nation’s largest energy consortium, Enron Corporation, de-
scended into bankruptcy during the fall of 2001, the nation was
shocked.137  Following the shock was outrage, as the media reported de-
tails surrounding Enron’s collapse, and the pay packages and extravagant
lifestyles of its executives.138  The public outcry sparked by Enron’s demise
was exacerbated by subsequently revealed scandals at other large public
companies.139  In the wake of these corporate scandals, Congress hur-
riedly passed legislation.  In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) was
passed.140  It was viewed as the most significant piece of business legisla-
tion enacted since the Great Depression.141
137. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN
THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) (recounting
details of Enron debacle).
138. In response to this attention and resulting public outrage, the Senate
Finance Committee commissioned an investigation into the accounting, corporate
governance, compensation, and tax practices of Enron. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM.
ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND
RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter JCT ENRON REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.jct.gov/s-3-03-vol1.pdf (reporting Enron investigation results).
139. For a discussion of these subsequent scandals, see supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
140. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) [hereinafter
SOX].  The SEC also responded to the plethora of corporate scandals in 2006 by
once again amending and significantly expanding the executive pay disclosure
rules.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to
Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Mat-
ters (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.
htm.  Among other changes, disclosures would now include a “plain English” nar-
rative that explains compensation information otherwise provided in a tabular
manner. See Leigh Johnson, et al., Preparing Proxy Statements Under the SEC’s New
Rules Regarding Executive and Director Compensation Disclosures, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.
373, 376–78 (2007) (discussing enhanced disclosure requirements of 2006
amendments).
141. See, e.g., John Paul Lucci, Enron—The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World
and the International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003); Larry
E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002); Nathan Wilda, Com-
ment, David Pays For Goliath’s Mistakes: The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has on Small
Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 671–72 (2004).
SOX has naturally been the subject of academic study, receiving mostly nega-
tive but some positive assessments. See id.  For a further discussion of academia’s
analysis, see infra note 204.  See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV.
915 (2003); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2003); Thomas L.
Greaney, Looking Beyond The Evildoers: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Law,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 961 (2003); Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching The Culprits: Is
Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801 (2003); Steven A. Ramirez, A
28
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SOX largely ignored executive pay matters, instead focusing mostly
on issues related to corporate governance and corporate fraud.142  It did,
however, contain three provisions addressing executive compensation is-
sues raised by the specific scandalous events of the time.  First, SOX pro-
hibited companies from making personal loans to executives and
directors.143  Second, SOX contained a “clawback” provision, requiring
covered executives to reimburse the company for certain compensation
paid in the event of a restatement of financial statements due to corporate
misconduct.144  Third, SOX shortened the timing required for disclosure
of new stock option grants.145
There were, however, other executive pay practices that received sig-
nificant attention in the Enron aftermath that SOX did not address.  In
particular, executive deferred compensation plans, known as nonqualified
deferred compensation (“NQDC”), were scrutinized when it was uncov-
ered that Enron executives were able to withdraw more than $53 million
in benefits from these plans within weeks of Enron filing for bank-
ruptcy.146  In contrast, throughout the couple weeks that immediately pre-
ceded bankruptcy, Enron employees were prevented by normal
administrative procedures from making changes to the investments in
their qualified 401(k) retirement plans.147  Because many had invested a
significant percentage of their plan balance in Enron stock and were re-
strained from offloading their Enron stock before it became essentially
Flaw In The Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Cor-
ruption?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 837 (2003).
142. For a discussion of SOX’s focus on corporate governance, see supra note
141; see also Michael J. Hussey, Has Congress Stopped Executives From Raiding the Bank?
A Critical Analysis of I.R.C. § 409A, 75 UMKC L. REV. 437, 437 (2006) (specifically
noting that Sarbanes-Oxley did not address nonqualified deferred compensation);
Alan Murray, Political Capital: Corporate Reforms Tamed Only Part of 3-Headed Beast,
WALL ST. J., May 6, 2004, at A4 (observing that Sarbanes-Oxley does little to effect
executive compensation).
143. SOX § 402.
144. Id. § 304.
145. Id. § 403 (requiring disclosures to be made within two business days of
grant instead of previous forty-five days after company’s fiscal closing).
146. See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 138, at 14, 627; Chason, supra note
136, at 349 (noting that Enron execs took early distributions of deferred benefits
once downfall became apparent); see also Richard Ehrhart, Section 409A—Treasury
“Newspeak” Lost in the “Briar Patch”, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 754 (2005) (noting
that key Enron executives withdrew benefits from NQDC plans as corporation ap-
proached bankruptcy).  These distributions drained Enron of available cash just
prior to bankruptcy. See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 138, at 636.  They were,
however, also recoverable under bankruptcy law. See Drennan, supra note 136, at
442–43 (2006); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Fixing Section 409A: Legislative and Adminis-
trative Options, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 635 (2012).
147. See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 138, at 38.  A change in record keep-
ers triggered the “blackout” period. Such changes are “a normal part of qualified
retirement plan operations.” Id.
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worthless, the end result was that many Enron employees not only lost
their jobs, but also their retirement savings.148
Congressional investigations into the matter showed that the tax law
had allowed executives to make use of certain favorable income tax rules
while enjoying the benefits of their NQDC plans.149  In response, Con-
gress enacted another tax penalty provision—section 409A—at the end of
2004 to limit the circumstances in which an executive participating in an
NQDC plan can receive distributions.150  Failure to comply with these
148. In the aggregate, 62% (or roughly $1.3 billion dollars) of 401(k) plan
assets were invested in Enron stock. See James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C.
Madrian, Are Empowerment and Education Enough?  Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans
2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 151, 169 (2005), available at http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2005_2_bpea_papers/2005b
_bpea_choi.pdf.  During the blackout period, “the price of Enron stock fell from
$15.40 to $9.98.” JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 138, at 38.  Enron’s demise also
affected employees’ interests in the Enron Employee Stock Ownership Plan. See id.
at 13.
149. See JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 138, at 14, 40 (discussing tax rules
previously governing NQDC); Mullane, supra note 101, at 500–05 (providing dis-
cussion and illustration of those tax rules).
150. See I.R.C. § 409A(a) (2006).  This executive compensation tax penalty,
like others, has been greatly criticized. See, e.g., Chason, supra note 136, at 360
(critiquing § 409A); William A. Drennan, The Pirates Will Party On!  The Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation Rules Will not Prevent CEOs From Acting Like Plundering Pirates
and Should Be Scuttled, 33 VT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (illustrating ineffectiveness of
§ 409A); Ehrhart, supra note 146, at 744 (same); Hussey, supra note 142, at 439
(concluding “§ 409A does not adequately address the perceived abuses regarding
nonqualified deferred compensation”); Yale & Polsky, supra note 136, at 573 (not-
ing criticism that “captive boards of directors use [deferred compensation] for the
primary purpose of passing tax benefits to executives (to the company’s tax detri-
ment) under shareholders’ radar screens”); see also Polsky, supra note 146.  Note,
too, that some view this provision as less about regulating executive compensation
per se and more about addressing the tax consequences, and potential resulting
tax benefit, of deferred compensation. See, e.g., Yale & Polsky, supra note 136, at
574–75.  In that regard, it is also important to note that application of § 409A is
not limited to executives.  Indeed, subject to exceptions, § 409A applies to any
taxpayer who defers compensation outside of a qualified plan, such as a 401(k).
See § 409A(d)(1), (3) (defining NQDC plan as “any plan that provides for the
deferral of compensation”); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(f) (2007) (defining service pro-
vider for purposes of § 409A); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(14) (2007) (ex-
cluding from § 409A’s reach some situations in which it is common practice for
service provider, such as teacher, to receive annualized (or deferred) compensa-
tion for period of service that comprises less than full year); Drennan, supra, at 26
(“[Section] 409A applies to all employers and employees that defer compensation,
including closely held corporations, subchapter S corporations, partnerships, and
charities.”); Brian Kopp, New Rules for Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 21 J.
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 5, 11 (“[T]he rules are a trap for the
unwary and may create more problems for small employers than large publicly
traded companies.”); Polsky, supra note 146.  Nevertheless, while deferred com-
pensation is not limited to being paid to executives, it is a form of compensation,
certainly in significant amounts, that is primarily available to executives. See Mul-
lane, supra note 101, at 503–04.  Further, it was controversy surrounding this aspect
of executive compensation that ultimately led to the enactment of § 409A. See id.;
Joy Sabino Mullane, The Unlearning Curve: Tax-Based Congressional Regulation Of Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (2011).
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rules subjects the deferred compensation under the NQDC plan to less
favorable federal income tax treatment.151  Section 409A also imposes a
twenty percent penalty tax on the participant for the noncompliant
NQDC.152
Throughout the recession and scandals of the early 2000s, there was a
decline in executive pay.153  However, executive pay began climbing again
shortly thereafter, beginning around 2003.154  Then, the second wave of
economic turbulence and scandal hit just a few years later.
2. The Second Wave
In 2008, the United States financial markets experienced a series of
events that led to what is perceived by many as “the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression.”155  The problems began when the housing
bubble burst, leading to the collapse of the mortgaged-backed securities
market.156  Financial institutions with significant exposure in this area sus-
tained extraordinary financial losses.157  Indeed, several large and well-
known financial institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and
Merrill Lynch, ultimately failed as a result.158
The losses incurred by financial institutions affected their ability to
extend credit, which created liquidity problems and slowed economic ac-
tivity.159  The federal government responded quickly to these events.  The
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”) was enacted, pro-
viding the Treasury department with the ability to make loans to troubled
financial institutions and otherwise provide equity to promote financial
market stability.160  Specifically, the EESA authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to establish a Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”) “to
151. See § 409A(a)(1) (subjecting noncompliant deferred compensation to
current, rather than deferred, taxation, plus interest).
152. See id. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(i)(II).
153. MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SHIERHOLZ, supra note 44, at 220 (providing that
pay ratio was 248 in 1999, 299 in 2000, 149 in 2002, 262 in 2005, and 275 in 2007—
latest date covered by this source); LEVINE, supra note 44, at 3 (providing that pay
ratio was 524 in 2000, 429 in 2001, 281 in 2002, 301 in 2003—latest date covered by
this source).
154. For a discussion of executives’ rising pay, see supra, note 153.
155. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Re-
sponse to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 953 (2011); see also Charles
W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What
Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV.
1243, 1249 (2011).
156. See Murdock, supra note 155, at 1244–45; see also Randall D. Guynn, The
Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010 BYU L. REV. 421, 422–34
(recounting events of 2008 financial crisis).
157. See Guynn, supra note 156, at 421–28.
158. See id. at 425.
159. See id.
160. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 et seq. (2006)) [hereinafter
EESA].
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purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled as-
sets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are
determined by the Secretary, and in accordance with [the EESA] and the
policies and procedures developed and published by the Secretary.”161
Reminiscent of the RFC in the Great Depression era, TARP imposed a
number of restrictions and requirements on the compensation paid to ex-
ecutives at companies participating in the program.  Many of these rules
were then expanded as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 (“ARRA”) in reaction to news of executives at troubled institu-
tions receiving bonuses and lavish perks.162  The following year, more gen-
erally applicable legislation (i.e., application was not limited to firms
receiving some form of government financial assistance) was enacted with
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank Act”).163
In general, for those companies participating in the TARP program,
executive compensation was subject to the following new rules.  Deduct-
ibility under section 162(m) was further limited to $500,000 including per-
formance-based pay.164  Additionally, other exceptions to the limits of
section 162(m) were eliminated or tightened.165  Further, the amount of
allowable—not just deductible—golden parachute payments to a com-
pany’s top executives was reduced or outright eliminated.166  Companies
were also required to examine the incentive compensation plans for their
senior executive officers to ensure that the plans did not encourage undue
risk-taking, and if so, to make appropriate modifications.167  Under TARP,
the compensation plans of senior executive officers also must contain a
“clawback” provision that becomes effective in the event of material inac-
curacies in a company’s “statements of earnings, gains, or other crite-
161. See id. § 5211(a)(1).
162. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 [hereinafter ARRA].
163. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
164. See EESA § 302(a); ARRA § 7001 (expanding limitation to all TARP re-
cipients during the TARP obligation period).
165. See EESA, § 302(a); ARRA, §§ 7001, 111(a)(5) (expanding limitation to
all TARP recipients during TARP obligation period); I.R.C. § 162(m)(5)(D)(i)-
(iii) (2006).
166. EESA § 111(b)(2)-(3); ARRA, §§ 7001, 111(b)(3)(C).
167. EESA § 111(b)(2)(A); ARRA, §§ 7001, 111(b)(3)(A).  Specifically, par-
ticipating companies are required to “exclude incentives for senior executive of-
ficers of a financial institution to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten
the value of the financial institution during the period that the Secretary holds an
equity or debt position in the financial institution.”  EESA § 111(b)(2)(A).  A se-
nior executive officer is defined as “one of the top 5 highly paid executives of a
public company, whose compensation” is subject to SEC proxy disclosure rules.
EESA § 111(b)(3).
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ria.”168  Finally, ARRA added some new restrictions on luxury
expenditures, the payment of bonuses, retention awards, or other incen-
tive compensation, and provided shareholders with a non-binding vote on
executive compensation.169
One executive compensation provision that was enacted as part of
EESA was not limited in application to those receiving some form of assis-
tance from the government.  Section 457A addresses the tax treatment of
nonqualified deferred compensation that is offered by certain specified
entities such as offshore hedge funds.170  This Code provision functions in
a manner similar to section 409A in that noncompliant compensation is
subject to less favorable federal income tax treatment, with the potential
for the imposition of a twenty percent penalty tax.171
Through the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress directed the SEC to promul-
gate a variety of rules affecting executive compensation plans at all pub-
licly held companies.172  Included were provisions that would provide
shareholders with a nonbinding vote on a company’s executive compensa-
tion plans, and expand the clawback rules enacted under SOX.173  Nota-
bly, among other amendments to SEC disclosure rules, companies were
required to start disclosing a comparison of the CEO’s pay to the pay of
the average employee.174
In accord with these events, executive pay contracted briefly in 2008
and 2009.175  However, executive pay levels were rising again by 2010.176
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
In a very real sense, the public did not care to engage in debates
about executive compensation packages when no one knew the extent or
168. EESA § 111(b)(2)(B).  ARRA expanded this rule to apply not only to
senior executive officers but also the next twenty most highly compensated em-
ployees.  ARRA §§ 7001, 111(b)(3)(B).
169. ARRA §§ 7001, 111(b)(3)(D)(i), 111(d), 111(e)(2) (bonus prohibition,
luxury expenditure limitation, and non-binding say on pay, respectively).
170. I.R.C. § 457A(a)-(b) (2006).
171. Id. § 457A(a), (c)(1); see also Polsky, supra note 146 (discussing how
§ 457A is right response to problem it is addressing, unlike § 409A, which has cre-
ated huge mess); Yale & Polsky, supra note 136, at 573–74 (discussing view of some
that these types of provisions are more about addressing tax consequences and
potential tax benefits of deferred compensation).
172. Although the Dodd-Frank Act is relatively recent, assessments and criti-
ques of the Act are starting to appear in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Christine
Hurt, Regulating Compensation, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 21, 55–65
(2011); Murdock, supra note 155, passim; Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive
Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 223–35 (2011); Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 155,
passim (criticizing Dodd-Frank Act).
173. Dodd-Frank, sec. 951, § 14A(a)(1), sec. 954 § 10D(b)(1).
174. See id. § 953(a)-(b).
175. See, e.g., Pradnya Joshi, We Knew They Got Raises.  But This?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2011, at BU1. (noting CEO pay shrank in 2008 and 2009).
176. See id. (reporting CEO pay in 2010 increased 23% from 2009).
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content of those packages.177  Instead, the public was generally fascinated
and enamored with executives and their lifestyle.178  All that changed with
the Great Depression.  Out of the Great Depression came knowledge, with
that knowledge came criticism, and ultimately the first instances of execu-
tive pay regulation.179
Thereafter followed a period of relative economic stability that lasted
about thirty years.180  During that time, the ratio of executive pay to that
of average workers remained fairly steady, as did the unemployment
rate.181  Nevertheless, executives were still compensated handsomely in
absolute terms.182
The early 1970s saw the first significant recession since the Great De-
pression, and with it came a spike in the unemployment rate.183  During
the 1970s, executive compensation also began rising notably in compari-
son to the pay of average workers.184  This increase occurred during a
time when, despite recovery from the perspective of analysts, the public
remained dissatisfied with the economy because of high inflation, an in-
creased unemployment rate, and slow wage growth.185  Interestingly, there
were no important movements to regulate executive pay at that time, and
certainly no meaningful congressional regulation of executive pay.  It is
also noteworthy that there were no remarkable executive compensation
controversies or scandals to galvanize public sentiment against executives
and act as a focusing event for legislators.
177. For a discussion of the public’s lack of information regarding executive
compensation, see supra notes 27–59 and accompanying text.
178. See id.  One question we may never be able to answer with certainty is
whether that knowledge would have prompted the same level of public and gov-
ernmental response if the economy had continued to grow instead of faltering.
Viewed differently, was the general public really upset that executives were making
so much or was it more that the public was making so little or nothing at all? But
see generally Wells, supra note 5, at 694 (arguing that “the fight over executive com-
pensation in the 1930s engaged deep questions about the nature of the corpora-
tion and the rewards due labor, hinting that there was a limit to the pay any man
could fairly demand”).
179. For a discussion of the emergence of executive pay regulation, see supra
notes 20–59 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of this economic stability, see supra notes 60–63 and
accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the post-Depression unemployment rate, see supra
notes 67–70 and accompanying text.  For a comparison of executive pay levels to
pay of the average worker, see supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
182. For discussion of executive compensation levels compared to average
worker pay in the post-Depression era, see supra notes 74–81 and accompanying
text.
183. For a discussion of this recession and the rise in unemployment, see
supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of the rise of executive pay during this time, see supra
notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of public dissatisfaction at this time, see supra note 66
and accompanying text.
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The early 1980s, however, saw a renewed interest in executive com-
pensation matters.  That growing interest coincided with a turbulent econ-
omy, a rising unemployment rate, and controversy surrounding
compensating executives with golden parachutes.186  The presence of
each of these factors at the same time stand out in contrast to the immedi-
ately preceding decades where there was remarkably less interest in execu-
tive compensation matters.  With this backdrop, Congress enacted tax
legislation attempting to limit golden parachutes: sections 280G and
4999.187  The foregoing suggest that it is the combination of a downward
moving economy, rising unemployment, and scandalous news regarding
executive pay that instigates significant public and policymaking attention
on executive compensation, resulting in legislation.
In any event, as the economy and jobs recovered in the mid to late
1980s, public and policymaking interest in executive compensation mat-
ters waned.  Of note, however, is that executive pay was rising significantly
during this same time frame.188  Yet those pay increases did not garner
extraordinary attention or elicit legislation until the next recession and
controversy regarding executive pay hit in the early 1990s.
The 1990s are also interesting to consider.  Once again, a recession
coincided with rising unemployment to incite a public uproar over execu-
tive pay.189  This uproar reached new levels after President Bush traveled
to Japan with leading American executives, which highlighted, among
other things, the privileged and protected pay status of American execu-
tives vis-a`-vis their foreign counterparts.190  The legislative response was
another tax penalty provision—section 162(m)—that was enacted in 1993
to both limit executive pay and make it more responsive to job perform-
ance.191  Importantly, thereafter, the economy boomed along with execu-
tive pay at a rate not seen previously.192  During the six or so years of
hugely escalating pay that followed section 162(m)’s enactment there was
186. For a discussion of the economy in the 1980s, see supra notes 82–105 and
accompanying text.  It is certainly plausible that the level of acquisitive activity
would have drawn attention to golden parachute agreements absent a troubled
economy.  Conversely, it is possible that if the economy had been booming little
attention would have been paid to golden parachute agreements.  Neither proposi-
tion can be proved with certainty.
187. For a discussion of these tax code provisions and their effect on para-
chute payments, see supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of the increase in executive pay during this time, see
supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of the recession and unemployment rate of the 1990s,
see supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of President Bush’s trip to Japan, see supra notes
113–15.
191. For a discussion of § 162(m), see supra notes 124–25 and accompanying
text.
192. For a discussion of this economic boom, see supra notes 126–30 and ac-
companying text.
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no significant movement to regulate executive compensation.193  Again,
that lack of focus changed with the next recession and catalyzing
controversy.
The 2000s have been a tumultuous decade, fraught with scandal and
two recessions.194  The country has yet to move beyond this point, and
executive compensation has been at the forefront of the public agenda for
most of the decade.  Not surprisingly, legislation has been enacted in re-
sponse to shape and rein-in executive pay: SOX, section 409A, section
457A, the TARP program, and the Dodd-Frank Act.
Reflecting on the above history shows that at those points in time that
Congress has chosen to act to regulate executive pay, three factors have
been present: an economic recession, a rising unemployment rate, and an
executive pay controversy that acts as a focusing event.  A closer examina-
tion also reveals that, alone, both a declining economy and rising unem-
ployment rate are insufficient to trigger legislation regulating executive
compensation. However, when combined with a pay controversy, histori-
cally, legislation has resulted.
The economy has continually fluctuated through peaks and troughs
over the last hundred-plus years.  Thus, there have certainly been reces-
sions that were not accompanied by a significant movement to regulate
executive pay, including a particularly notable recession in the early
1970s.195  Like the economy, the unemployment rate has also fluctuated
over time, generally in rhythm with the economy.  Accordingly, there have
been times when the unemployment rate has risen without triggering ex-
ecutive pay regulation.196  Further, there were times during the 1940s-
1970s when the country experienced a recession with an associated in-
crease in unemployment but no major movement to regulate executive
pay.  Importantly, at those times there were no significant pay controver-
sies to act as focusing events.
A significant executive pay controversy has occurred during each cru-
cial time period that Congress has enacted legislation regulating executive
pay: the revelation of exorbitant pay levels in the Bethlehem Steel and
American Tobacco litigation and from congressional investigations in the
early 1930s, the use of golden parachutes as a potential shield from corpo-
rate decision-making in the early 1980s, the receipt of high levels of execu-
tive pay seemingly unrelated to performance when contrasted with the pay
of foreign counterparts in the early 1990s, preferential treatment for the
193. There were academic discussions and studies regarding § 162(m)’s effec-
tiveness, or lack thereof, as well as mundane reporting on executive pay matters.
For a discussion of these criticisms of § 162(m), see supra note 125.
194. For a discussion of the 2000s, see supra notes 131–76 and accompanying
text.
195. For a discussion of this recession, see supra notes 64–66 and accompany-
ing text.
196. Again, the 1970s are notable in this regard. See supra notes 60–81 and
accompanying text.
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deferred compensation of executives while the retirement savings of aver-
age employees was wiped out during the fall of Enron Corporation in the
early 2000s, and aspects of another pay without performance controversy
surrounding the pay, bonuses, and other perks received by executives at
bailed out financial institutions in the late 2000s.  These incidents not only
predate legislative action, but also seemingly act as focusing events that
intensify and rally public sentiment on executive pay matters.197  Indeed,
legislative action either refers to particular scandalous events, involves in-
vestigations of such events, or both.198
In that way, these controversial events seem so important to the exec-
utive pay regulation calculus that perhaps they, alone, are sufficient to trig-
ger legislative action.  However, in each instance where there has been
legislative regulation of executive pay, there has also been economic tur-
moil and rising unemployment.199  It is thus difficult to examine the ex-
tent to which regulation would have still occurred in the absence of the
197. The role of the media is unclear, but should not be overlooked here.
Some view the media as instigators of public focus on specific issues, directing
which issues the public considers significant and then shaping individual views on
those issues. See MAXWELL MCCOMBS, The Agenda Setting Function of the Press, in THE
PRESS: AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY 156, 159–60 (Geneva Overholser &
Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2005).  This is referred to as the agenda-setting the-
ory. See id. (discussing this theory).  Others view the media as more responsive to
the issues on which the public is already focused. See Joseph E. Uscinski, When Does
the Public’s Issue Agenda Affect the Media’s Issue Agenda (and Vice-Versa)?  Developing a
Framework for Media-Public Influence., 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 796, 799 (2009).  This latter
theory is the audience-driven model, and has been less well studied than the
agenda-setting theory.  Both theories have their supporters and detractors. See,
e.g., W. Russell Neuman & Lauren Guggenheim, The Evolution of Media Effects The-
ory: A Six Stage Model of Cumulative Research, 21 COMM. THEORY 169, 172 (2011)
(discussing theory which considers media’s influence as minimal); see also Doris
Graber, The Media and Democracy: Beyond Myths and Stereotypes, 6 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
139, 145 (2003) (critiquing audience-driven theory).  Pertinent to this Article, the
underlying question is to what extent is the media provoking versus reflecting pub-
lic sentiment toward executive pay.  Again, scholarship assessing the media’s role is
not of uniform opinion.
Interestingly, a former editor for The Economist, Matthew Bishop, has com-
mented specifically about the role of the media in executive pay matters.  Accord-
ing to Bishop, there is a correlation between the state of the economy and the tone
of reporting on executive compensation due to the types of articles the public
wants to read at those times. See Matthew Bishop et al., The Media and Executive
Compensation: A Panel Discussion, 30 J. CORP. L. 795, 797–98 (2005) (discussing that
while journalism has ability to influence debate over executive compensation, its
role is not as effective as some might think because readers desire to read different
types of stories depending on how economy is doing).  In other words, when the
economy is doing well, readers want to read positive stories and do not care as
much about the salaries of CEOs. See id. Conversely, when the economy is doing
poorly, readers want to read negative stories critical of executive compensation.
See id.
198. For further discussion of this legislative action, see supra notes 29, 87,
121, 139 and accompanying text.
199. Professor Ribstein theorizes that stock market booms and bubbles have a
natural tendency to encourage the public to be more trusting and overconfident,
thus failing to notice or suspect fraudulent corporate and executive behavior. See
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latter two factors.  Indeed, similar statements can be made with regard to
each of the three important factors identified in this Article, which is the
point: it is the convergence of these factors that seems to matter.
This still leaves for consideration the role of executive pay levels in
triggering pay regulation.  Executive pay levels are certainly not irrele-
vant.200  Nevertheless, as noted above, during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,
rising executive pay levels alone did not lead to a heightened focus on
executive compensation.  More importantly, executive pay has been esca-
lating nearly constantly on average since the 1970s, unlike the economy
and unemployment rate, which fluctuate, or scandalous events, which oc-
cur sporadically.201  Taken together, these facts suggest that pay levels do
not play an overly important role in instigating criticism and regulation.202
Put differently, in recent times, escalating executive pay levels act more as
a constant; it thus seemingly takes other variables to incite widespread
public condemnation of executive pay resulting in legislative regulation:
Ribstein, supra note 5, at 81.  Once the market goes bust, however, the blinders are
taken off and the resulting revelations result in regulation. See id. at 81–82.
200. Indeed, one aim of some executive pay regulation has been reining it in.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993) (regarding Tax Code § 162(m),
Senate Finance Committee believed “excessive compensation [would] be reduced
if the deduction for compensation (other than performance-based compensation)
paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations [was] limited”).
201. Pay levels have contracted briefly around recessionary times, but then
they rebound and continue to grow. See MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SHIERHOLZ, supra
note 44, at 220; Frydman & Saks, supra note 44; LEVINE, supra note 75, at 2–3.
202. The historical context suggesting that soaring pay levels standing alone
are not an important factor could be a product of a lagging effect, where it takes
several years—or, in these instances, six or more—of escalating pay before the
issue grabs a hold of public attention.  Further, since those periods of escalating
pay followed legislative and other regulatory actions, it is possible the public ini-
tially proceeds under the assumption that such regulation will be effective in re-
sponding to the public’s concerns and thus the passage of time is necessary to
reveal that the legislation has not done so.  As discussed briefly below, those seem
like unlikely explanations.
As to the possibility of a lagging effect, one would think it would take less than
six years of escalating pay for the public to take note and complain about executive
compensation.  In any event, the fact that pay levels were not the subject of intense
criticism until the next recession and associated rise in unemployment is either
very interesting timing or more than coincidence.
More complicated is the possibility that the public perceives that any enacted
regulation will be effective in reining in or shaping executive compensation, and
so the issue lays dormant for a period of time until it becomes clear that such
regulation is not working.  If that were the case, though, one would expect to see
repeated attempts to regulate in the failed area.  But, that is not the case.  With
each nexus of factors, the resultant legislation is tailored to the concerns that arose
out of the relevant scandalous controversies of the time.
There is also the possibility that the importance of executive pay lays not in its
level but in its structure.  Thus, the relevance is the revelation that executive pay is
not functioning in a manner the public finds acceptable.  It is important to note,
though, that negative public sentiment regarding executive pay has tended to exist
prior to the revelation of any particular controversial compensation structure.
Once revealed, however, those structures not only act as focusing events triggering
regulation, but also become the subject of regulation.
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namely, a turbulent economy, rising unemployment, and an executive pay
controversy.203
In the final analysis, executives have not been a constant focus of high
levels of public animus.  At those times when they have been, and Con-
gress has also been moved to take action, three elements have been pre-
sent: economic turmoil, increased unemployment, and a pay controversy
to act as a focusing event.  Each of these three elements typically evokes
strong emotions from main-street Americans, particularly those who have
lost their jobs or are otherwise struggling to make ends meet.  Politicians
are wise, certainly from a political perspective, to not idly ignore the
masses calling for executive pay to be controlled in some manner.
Nevertheless, legislation enacted to regulate executive compensation
has been roundly criticized for being ineffective and typically generating
significant negative and unintended consequences.204  It is unlikely Con-
203. It should be noted that many other potential factors that might be rele-
vant in triggering regulation were considered and discarded in the researching of
this Article: for example, changes in wages after adjusting for inflation, the misery
index, and the Gini coefficient.  Certainly, the list of possible factors that one
could consider is almost endless.  However, most of the factors one might view as
potentially relevant are measures of how the public is faring in terms of financial
quality of life, much like the economy and general unemployment rate.  In that
regard, the most coincident factor appeared to be the unemployment rate, and a
review of the historical data regarding other measures did not reveal any uniquely
significant changes surrounding the relevant time periods.
Take, for example, the Gini coefficient—a measure of income inequality.
The Gini coefficient has been continually trending upward since the Great Depres-
sion, indicating that America is in that way becoming more inequitable over time.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE
NATION’S INCOME DISTRIBUTION: 1947–1998 passim (2000), available at www.census.
gov/prod/2000pubs/p60-204.pdf; Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor
& Jessica C. Smith, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POV-
ERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009  40 tbl. A-2
(2010), [hereinafter CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS], available at http://www.cen-
sus.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf.  Specifically, prior to 1974, the Gini coeffi-
cient experienced some measure of fluctuations. See id. at 43.  However, between
1974 and 1989 the Gini coefficient was continually on the rise with no periods of
contraction. See id. at 41–43.  It declined in 1990 and 1991, before returning to a
level above that in 1989 and thereafter climbing until 1997. See id. at 41. There
was another two-year decline in 1998 and 1999, before it returned to a level above
that of 1997 and climbed until 2001. See id. at 40–41. In 2002 and 2003, the Gini
declined again before retuning in 2004 to the 2001 level and then climbing until
2006. See id. at 40. The next decline occurred in 2007, but was climbing again by
2009, the most recent year for which this information is available. See id.
In sum, the Gini coefficient does indicate an increase in inequality in the years
preceding executive pay controversy and regulation, but it also shows that, but for
brief periods generally coinciding with an economic recession, since 1974 it has
been continually on the rise.  Thus, similar to executive pay levels, in recent times
growing income inequality is more of a constant and in that way cannot explain a
sudden increased interest in executive pay.
204. For a criticism of legislation designed to regulate executive pay, see
supra notes 103, 125, 142, 150, and 173.  There has also been some praise for
corporate governance legislation, but the weight of assessments has been more
critical. See, e.g., Brian Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 236
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gress would repeal existing legislation, although perhaps some of it could
be altered favorably.205  More importantly, though, there is nothing to
suggest that the convergence of events that leads to such deficient legisla-
tion is not likely to occur again.206  This raises the question of what Con-
gress should do—how it should respond—the next time.
IV. TAX-BASED REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION:
A CASE STUDY AND A PRESCRIPTION
Legislators seemingly feel compelled to act at those key moments
when the three factors identified in this Article coalesce.  However, for a
variety of reasons their actions are seriously flawed.207  There are several
solutions to this paradox, although none of them are easy.  Legislators
could resist the call to action, but that would risk their position if voters
viewed them as aligned with executives or otherwise unsympathetic to the
(2003) (“[SOX] is a measured law that will help restore and maintain confidence
in the market by curbing corporate abuses and increasing transparency.”);
Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
329, 355 (2003) (“Sarbanes-Oxley was a measured and appropriate response to the
abject failures in U.S. corporate governance typified by Enron.”); see also Jesse
Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 IOWA J. CORP. L. 721, 745–51 (2011)
(providing partially positive assessment of aspects of Dodd-Frank Act).
205. For a discussion suggesting Congress will not repeal its corporate govern-
ance legislation, see infra notes 207–15 (regarding political considerations in-
volved in repealing executive pay legislation).  Note, too, that although the jury is
out as to whether the amendments were positive, the Dodd-Frank Act did amend
portions of SOX. See, e.g., Jessica Luhrs, Note, Encouraging Litigation: Why Dodd-
Frank Goes Too Far in Eliminating the Procedural Difficulties in Sarbanes-Oxley, 8 HAS-
TINGS BUS. L.J. 175, 180–85 (2012) (describing Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX).
206. Indeed, over time, these pivotal moments have occurred at more fre-
quent intervals.
207. Common reasons proffered are inherent flaws in the method of regula-
tion, the swiftness with which legislation was enacted raising concerns regarding
both time to appropriately consider legislation and extent to which legislation is
merely symbolic, and a narrowly tailored response to events not likely to occur
again. See, e.g., Mullane, supra note 150, at 1066–68 (discussing inherent flaws of
using tax penalties to regulate executive compensation); Zelinsky, supra note 97
(criticizing use of tax penalties); see also, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?:
Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2002) (claiming that officer certification
provisions of SOX are merely symbolic); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There
a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2003)
(“[A]greement was reached rapidly on [SOX].”); Larry E. Ribstein, SARBOX: The
Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 282–83 (“Congress hurriedly passed
Sarbanes-Oxley.”); Ribstein, supra note 5, at 82 (“[B]ecause the frauds of the next
boom are unlikely to resemble those of the previous one, regulations imposed that
are designed to deal with such frauds will not prevent future schemes.”); Miriam
Miquelon Weismann, Corporate Transparency or Congressional Window Dressing?  The
Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley as a Means to Avoid Another Corporate Debacle: The Failed
Attempt to Revive Meaningful Regulatory Oversight, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 98,
101–02 (2004) (criticizing SOX in light of “failed legislative reform paradigm” of
corporate self-regulation).
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plight and pleas of voters.  Alternatively, legislators could enact legislation
that effectively meets stated goals and has minimal, insignificant side ef-
fects, but such a regulatory vehicle seemingly has yet to be discovered by
legislators.208  Another possibility is that perhaps legislators could at least
be convinced to not go down the least fruitful paths.
Tax-based regulation of executive pay provides a basis for an interest-
ing case study.  Scholars have considered the use of tax penalties to regu-
late executive compensation from various angles and have found their use
severely lacking.209  This Article shows more concretely that such tax regu-
lation appears to be reactionary legislation appealing to populist anger in
times of economic turmoil.  Combined with other research showing that
tax penalties on executive compensation have been ineffective methods of
regulation, create negative unintended consequences, and cause indis-
criminate harms, the conclusion that this form of regulation needs to
cease is inescapable.210  Indeed, it is time to consider more deeply—in
light of history and experience—the extent to which regulation of execu-
tive compensation is needed, what the goals of any regulation should be,
and, if achievable, how best to attain those goals.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, convincing Congress to either forego
use of the Tax Code or examine its use more deeply is challenging.  To
begin, with so much business before Congress covering vast areas of exper-
tise, it is difficult for legislators to be fully informed about the content of
all pieces of legislation, much less any surrounding academic literature.
Furthermore, imposing tax penalties on executive compensation above
certain levels or on certain types of pay has strong symbolic appeal.  The
Tax Code is uniquely positioned to seemingly punish executives finan-
cially by increasing their tax burden.  That result may be particularly ap-
pealing to average Americans during recessionary times when many are
out of work.
Interestingly, the most realistic option for dealing with the conun-
drum of regulating executive compensation derives from a common prac-
tice in enacting tax legislation.  Congress could be encouraged to enact
executive pay legislation with a sunset provision.211  In that way, if Con-
208. This assumes legislators are genuinely interested in enacting effective, as
opposed to merely symbolic, legislation.
209. For a discussion of this criticism of tax penalties, see supra notes 103,
125, 150 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion concluding that tax-based executive compensation regu-
lation will prove ineffective, see supra notes 103, 125, and 150.  Use of tax incen-
tives to encourage desirable compensation levels or structures has yet to receive
serious consideration—an area this author plans to explore in future writing.
211. For example, several significant tax acts have been enacted with sunset
provisions. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107–16, 115 Stat. 38; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108–27, 117 Stat 752; Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Authori-
zation, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.
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gress took no steps to renew or modify the existing legislation prior to its
sunset date, the law would automatically expire and revert to its prior state.
Although use of a sunset provision is not without its downsides, it
could provide several countervailing benefits in this context.212  To begin,
a sunset provision would allow Congress to act without necessarily perma-
nently enshrining bad law.  When it comes to regulating executives, even if
a law is ineffective and causing other harms, legislators risk appearing as
though they are benefiting executives if they vote in favor of repealing
such legislation.213  Even though that would not be the case with such
flawed legislation, the appearance of granting special favors to executives
is something legislators may want to avoid even during those times when
negative public sentiment is not rampant.  A sunset provision allows for
time to pass, and with it distance from emotionally charged events.  With
that time and distance, the political environment could be such that legis-
lators would be in a position to remain passive, and let bad legislation
expire without being forcefully charged by the press, public, or candidates
from other parties with claims of favoritism.  Thus, a sunset provision pro-
vides opportunities for a change in the rhetoric or posturing surrounding
the removal of legislation.
A sunset provision allows not only time for the political environment
to settle, but also encourages reflection on, and an examination of, legisla-
tive results.214  Such post-hoc study ideally would inform Congress’s con-
212. The principal criticisms of using sunset provisions in tax legislation are
as follows: (1) they are a means of subverting congressional budgetary rules, (2)
they are “rent-extracting mechanisms,” and (3) they impair stability and thus affect
the ability of taxpayers to make long term plans in affected areas.  Rebecca M.
Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40
GA. L. REV. 335, 340–42 (2006).  The first of those criticisms is the most significant,
but is mostly relevant in the context of tax legislation that reduces revenue (e.g.,
tax rate cuts), and thus a sunset provision is used as a vehicle for enacting legisla-
tion on a temporary basis that budgetary rules would not permit to be enacted
permanently.  That particular concern is not relevant in the context of executive
pay regulation, as such regulation generally takes the form of tax differences that,
if applicable, raise revenue.  However, the potential revenue-raising function of
such executive pay provisions could present budgetary challenges for a Congress
considering allowing those provisions to sunset.  The second of the delineated crit-
icisms is a valid concern, and it is certainly possible that interest groups will pre-
vent these provisions from expiring or legislators will use expiring provisions for
political purposes.  Nevertheless, with a sunset provision there is a stronger chance
for a more positive outcome.  The third criticism is discussed below.
213. See, e.g., Polsky, supra note 17, at 926 (“Perhaps the worst aspect of
§ 162(m) is its likely permanence.  It would be politically difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to repeal the provision.  Proponents of repeal would be criticized for trying to
make it easier for firms to pay executives more than $1,000,000 in performance-
insensitive pay.”).
214. One of the drawbacks of sunset provisions is that they make it difficult
for affected parties to make long term plans.  That cost may, however, be worth it
to reap the benefits outlined above of sunset provisions in this context.  However,
due to the potential for a subsequent change in the law, one corporate response to
a sunset provision might be for the company to continue its practices to whatever
extent possible, as if the law had not been enacted.  Taking a wait-and-see ap-
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sideration of whether legislation should be extended, modified, or allowed
to expire.  Further, a sunset provision could provide a mechanism for pos-
sible refinements to legislation that may be beneficial primarily due to
changes in the executive compensation and corporate governance
environment.215
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the socio-political context of congres-
sional regulation of executive pay from its beginnings in the Great Depres-
sion era through to modern times.  In doing so, it shows that Congress
produces regulatory legislation when three factors coalesce: economic tur-
moil, rising unemployment, and an executive pay controversy.  This does
confirm casual observations that the state of the economy and jobs are
important factors surrounding any movement to regulate executive pay.
Nevertheless a more considered study of business and unemployment cy-
cles shows those factors alone are not sufficient to elicit legislation.  Legis-
lation results, historically, when those factors are combined with an
executive pay controversy that acts as a focusing event.
Given the nature and increasing frequency with which the conver-
gence of these events has been occurring in modern times, it is reasonable
to conclude that they are likely to occur again.  When that happens, the
best-case scenario would be Congress enacting legislation that effectively
meets its stated goals and has no, or only neutral, side effects.  If history is
a guide, however, the results are more likely to be ineffective and create
negative unintended consequences.  As a precautionary measure for the
latter scenario, Congress should enact such future legislation with a sunset
provision.
proach is certainly a realistic option when dealing with tax legislation, as the costs
are largely financial.  Thus, so long as the company is in a position to bear any
increased tax costs, there is nothing else in such legislation that would prohibit the
company from using this approach. See Mullane, supra note 150, at 1048–51 (dis-
cussing inherent flaws of using tax penalties to regulate executive compensation).
In fact, many companies presently purposely incur tax penalties by failing to con-
form pay practices to the standards deemed desirable by Congress. See id. at
1050–65.  In the case of those companies that would alter their behavior to con-
form to legislation enacted with a sunset provision, Congress and academics alike
would then presumably be in a position to assess the consequences of the
legislation.
215. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 16, at 677 (arguing that “in light of evolv-
ing corporate governance mechanisms, the marginal net benefit of incentive-laden
pay packages is both smaller than appreciated and getting smaller over time.  As a
result, the assumption that higher proportions of incentive pay are beneficial is no
longer warranted,” and at minimum performance-based pay exception in
§ 162(m) should be repealed).
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APPENDIX
UNITED STATES AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE
YEAR RATE YEAR RATE YEAR RATE
1923 3.3 1952 3.0 1981 7.6
1924 3.3 1953 2.9 1982 9.7
1925 3.3 1954 5.5 1983 9.6
1926 3.3 1955 4.4 1984 7.5
1927 3.3 1956 4.1 1985 7.2
1928 3.3 1957 4.3 1986 7.0
1929 3.3 1958 6.8 1987 6.2
1930 8.9 1959 5.5 1988 5.5
1931 15.9 1960 5.5 1989 5.3
1932 23.6 1961 6.7 1990 5.6
1933 24.9 1962 5.5 1991 6.8
1934 21.7 1963 5.7 1992 7.5
1935 20.1 1964 5.2 1993 6.9
1936 17.0 1965 4.5 1994 6.1
1937 14.3 1966 3.8 1995 5.6
1938 19.0 1967 3.8 1996 5.4
1939 17.2 1968 3.6 1997 4.9
1940 14.6 1969 3.5 1998 4.5
1941 9.9 1970 4.9 1999 4.2
1942 4.7 1971 5.9 2000 4.0
1943 1.9 1972 5.6 2001 4.7
1944 1.2 1973 4.9 2002 5.8
1945 1.9 1974 5.6 2003 6.0
1946 3.9 1975 8.5 2004 5.5
1947 3.9 1976 7.7 2005 5.1
1948 3.8 1977 7.1 2006 4.6
1949 5.9 1978 6.1 2007 4.6
1950 5.3 1979 5.8 2008 5.8
1951 3.3 1980 7.1 2009 9.3
2010 9.6
Source: United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics216
216. See Robert VanGiezen & Albert E. Schwenk, Compensation From Before
World War I Through the Great Depression, COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS,
Fall 2001, at 1, 20, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archive/fall2001art3.
pdf. (detailing unemployment statistics from 1923 to 1942); LABOR FORCE
STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES: TABLE 1—
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EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION, 1941 TO
DATE (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat01.pdf. (giving unem-
ployment statistics from 1943 until 1947); Where Can I Find the Employment Rate for
Previous Years?, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev_
yrs.htm (last modified Mar. 9, 2011) (detailing unemployment information from
1948 to 2010).
It should be noted that the methodology for determining the unemployment
rate has changed over the years, as has the composition of the labor force.  For
more information regarding those changes, see How the Government Measures
Unemployment, , U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_
htgm.htm (last modified Oct. 16, 2009) (explaining historical changes in
unemployment rate); BLS Handbook of Methods, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch1_d.htm (last modified Apr. 17, 2003)
(detailing changes to calculation of unemployment rate in 1930s through 1990s).
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